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DICTA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST, Professor of Law, University of Denver

The past year was marked by a number of opinions by the
Supreme Court of Colorado on constitutional matters. The decisions
dealt with important matters, for the most part. But of equal importance with the substance of what was decided is the manner
of deciding cases. In its approach to the decision of cases, the
Court appeared during the year to vacillate between caution and
boldness in ruling on constitutional matters.
As for the substance, the Court held the Denver ordinance
authorizing conditional suspensions of sentences for ordinance
violations to be invalid in a difficult to follow opinion. A Littleton
license tax upon curb cuts was found to violate constitutional mandates requiring uniformity in taxation. The Colorado statute providing for the effect to be given foreign judgments in divorce and
support matters was struck down, without the citation of as much
as a single authority from this or any other jurisdiction, and on a
constitutional ground never raised or argued in either the trial
court or in the Supreme Court. By way of contrast, the Court
was cautious in refusing to give the Senate an advisory opinion
on the constitutionality of the new severance tax, lest private
rights be prejudiced in a non-adversary proceeding. Similarly, the
Court cautiously employed a case by case approach in considering
the validity of the statute governing the procedure of criminal
trials in which insanity is pleaded by way of defense. The Court
avoided this question altogether in one case, reversing a conviction
on other grounds. And in another case, in which the conviction was reversed because of errors in the giving of instructions and admission of evidence, the Court ruled that the statutory procedure did not deprive the defendant of any of his
constitutional rights since he had been accorded a fair trial and
it therefore didn't matter what might be done to him under the
statute, if it were followed.
If some of the remarks in an analyses of the opinions which
follow seem sharply critical, it would be well to bear in mind what
seem to the author to be factors which contribute substantially
to decisions that are sometimes somewhat less than clear cut,
sometimes wrong and totally unsupported by authority. A study
of the briefs and argument of counsel in an oustanding instance
or two indicates that counsel sometimes make constitutional arguments without citing either the constitutional language upon which
counsel rely or any of the authorities which might support the argument. A busy court, unassisted by law clerks, can hardly be
expected to research every point raised by counsel and to find the
authorities to complete counsel's argument. It can be said that the
' The

year intervening between the October, 1954, convention of the Colorado
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better opinions are on those cases in which counsel has been most
helpful to the Court. The Court, of course, must accept the responsibility for deciding cases on points never raised or argued
by counsel.
POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT TO IMPOSE CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES

In Holland v. McAuliffe -'the ordinance of the City and County
of Denver was invalidated which authorized its Municipal Court
to impose conditional sentences and suspend fines or imprisonment during observance by a defendant of the condition. The
defendant in the Municipal Court of Denver was convicted on
Sept. 11, 1953, of violations of the motor vehicle traffic ordinances.
He was sentenced for a total of 90 days in the county jail and
fines totalling $200. The Court, purporting to act under a 1950
ordinance, suspended the jail sentence and $100 of the fines on
condition that defendant "refrain from driving any motor vehicle
for one year from date." More than 4 months thereafter. and
purporting to act under an amendment of the 1950 ordinance effective Nov. 21, 1953, the Municipal Court caused defendant to be
arrested for non-compliance with the condition. Defendant had
driven a motor vehicle in Adams County on January 7, 1954. The
ordinance of 1950 had provided that sentences could be suspended
conditionally by the Municipal Court but made no provisions for
reinstatement of the penalties for violation of the conditions. Pursuant to the amendment, the Municipal Court vacated the suspension, reinstated the original penalties, and denied defendant's
application to appeal because the appeal was not perfected within
the 10 days after final judgment as required by the statute.
Defendant filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking an
order prohibiting the Municipal Court from any further proceedings. Attack was made upon the order of the Municipal Court
on the grounds, among others, that (1) the ordinance was repugnant to the Colorado Constitution and the city charter limiting
the jurisdiction of the Justice and Municipal Courts to penalties
of $300 fine or 90 days in the county jail; (2) the ordinance providing for reinstatement of penalties was retroactively appliedin what respect retroactivity is repugnant to the Constitution was
not specified by counsel-; and (3) even if valid, the ordinance
could not be applied as against this defendant because to do so
would be to give extra-territorial effect to the orders of the Municipal Court since the violation of the conditional suspension took
place in Adams County-and the Court was not advised by counsel
of any constitutional reason why the Municipal Court could not
look beyond the city limits.
Concerning the question whether the Municipal Court had
exceeded its jurisdiction, the Court refers to Article VI, Section
'Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 13, p. 463; 286 P. 2d 1107.
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28, of the State Constitution and to Article VIII, Section 156 and
Article XIV, Section 219 of the city charter as authority for invali. dating the ordinance. The pertinent part of the State Constitution requires that all laws relating to courts shall be general and
of uniform operation. The charter provisions alluded to place
original jurisdiction in the justice courts over all cases of violation
of the charter or ordinances and provide that the council shall have
power to enforce ordinances by ordaining fines not exceeding $300
or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days. The Court concluded,
". .. contrary to the terms of the ordinance this jurisdiction cannot extend beyond the limit of the ninety-day jurisdiction of the
court. The ordinance attempting to provide such probationary
jurisdiction or control of the defendant for a period of two years,
is clearly beyond the limit of any jail sentence that could be imposed."
Very little attention and no authority was given to the proposition that the ordinance was retroactively applied and therefore
invalid as to the defendant. The Court ventured the opinion that
"While summary procedure in police court cases is countenanced
from the standpoint of expedience, such recognition does not
tolerate retroactive procedure such as above indicated." Why? The
Court does not tell us, and counsel nowhere advised the Court that
any provision in the State Constitution or charter prohibits the
enactment of laws having retrospective operation.
Only bare mention was made by the Court concerning the contention that the Municipal Court was attempting to assume extraterritorial jurisdiction. Said the Supreme Court: "The condition
upon which the suspension was entered, namely, 'refrain from
driving any motor vehicle for one year from date,' if given the
effect the police court seemed to invoke, the court's jurisdiction
would apparently become worldwide regardless of the territorial
limits, because the alleged violation of the suspension condition
here was not within the territorial limits of the City and County
of Denver." If the Supreme Court meant so to rule, it gives us
no specific reason, constitutional or otherwise. And if the Court
meant so to rule, does the rule not also invalidate the statutes 3
permitting peace officers of Colorado to pursue and take fugitives
from Colorado from other states without interference and waiving
legal requirements for extradition, and permitting Colorado parole
and probation officers to go into another state to which parolees
and probationers have been released and to arrest and return
such parolees and probationers to Colorado for violation of the
terms of their parole or probation in such other state? The
Supreme Court of the United States, while not ruling on the specific question before us, has held that nothing in the Constitution
174-3-3 and 4 and 74-3-9, '53 C.R.S. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
-4(d) (2) and (3), and 4(f)-providing for service of Summons on residents of
Colo. found outside the State, may also be in peril if the Court meant what it
seems to have said.
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of the United States prevents Wisconsin from conditioning the
collection of an income tax, on income earned in Wisconsin, upon
the payment of dividends out of that income in the State of New
York. 4 And in Milliken v. Meyer,5 a case with which our Court
should be familiar, the Supreme Court of the United States held
valid a judgment of a Wyoming court whose jurisdiction over the
defendant was conditioned upon the service of summons in Denver.
As a practical matter, the Court could have avoided any reference to the questions of retroactivity and extra-territoriality
since the ordinance under which the Municipal Court purported to
act had been declared invalid as being in excess of the powers of
the city council and jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. As a constitutional law case, the opinion must be considered as having
value and as speaking with authority only to the effect that the
imposition of conditional sentences for a period in excess of the
90 days which justice courts are empowered to impose in Deliver
is an attempt to exercise a power not given to the City and consequently invalid.
TAXATION OF PROPERTY RIGHT DISGUISED AS FEE FOR REGULATION

In a case involving the ordinances of the City of Littleton.6
the defendant was charged with and convicted of violation of an
ordinance providing "that for the purpose of regulating streets,
• . . the use and manner of motor vehicles entering and leaving
private property from and to the public streets and avenues; the
use of vehicular parking space or spaces along the curb lines of
streets and avenues;" the owner of any property having a curb
cut, used for business purposes in a commercial zone, shall obtain
a permit from the Building Inspector and pay an annual fee therefor. The defendant was assessed a fee for use of a concrete apron
between the street and the sidewalk abutting on defendant's place
of business. The apron, falling to the level of the street and not
separated therefrom by a curb, ran all along the side of defendant's
property for half a block. It had been installed years before enactment of the ordinance in question. While the apron abutted
on defendant's property for a distance of 146 feet, the City assessed
defendant only for that 44 feet which seemed, on examination of
vehicle tracks, to be used by defendant in entering and leaving his
property. Revenue from the curb cut fees was placed in the City's
general fund.
Issues considered by the Court included the contention that
if the fee imposed is not justified as a regulatory police measure
it is invalid both as a purported property tax and as a license fee.
The Court found the revenue raising character of the fee to be unIWisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267
(1940).
5 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940).
' Heckendorf v. Littleton, Colorado Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number
12; 286 P. 2d 615.
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mistakable since the City spent no money for regulation of the use
of the curb cut and engaged in no inspection other than to measure
the cut and assess the fee. Nor could the Court find any special
privilege enjoyed by the defendant aside from the privilege of
entering and leaving his property, which privilege looked like a
property right, and the taxation of which rendered the tax in violation of the uniformity required by Article X of the State Constitution in the levying of taxes.
The result seems to be consistent with Walker v. Bedford 7
in which it was held that a special additional registration fee on
motor vehicles was an exaction for no special privilege in particular or for any regulatory purpose but rather for the sole purpose
of raising revenue. The tax was laid according to the value of the
motor vehicle. The statute involved was entitled "An Act to Provide Additional Emergency Relief Funds . . ." and its character
as a revenue raising measure without any purported regulation
was clear. Property, then, was the only ascertainable base upon
which the exaction could fall; and the additional tax on only one
kind of property destroyed the uniformity of the property tax.
The decision in the instant case should not discourage a city
from taxing curb cuts if it desires to do so. There is ample authority in the Colorado cases to sustain a realistic license tax, as distinguished from a tax which seems to fall upon nothing if not upon
property." One who employs a curb cut to enter his property from
the front or along the side, rather than at the rear, actually is
enjoying a special right or privilege in the use of the street, inconsistent with the right of the general public to use that part of
the street for proper purposes such as parking. In addition, one
who enjoys a curb cut may be depriving the city of revenues derived from parking meters which might otherwise have been installed, and for that special privilege the user of the curb cut may
be required to pay tribute. The problem seems to be one primarily
of draftsmanship of ordinances, in which the tax must be made
to appear as a license fee for regulatory purposes or as an excise
tax upon a special privilege.
THE COURT REFUSES AN ADVISORY OPINION

The Senate, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3, of the State
Constitution, requested an advisory opinion on seven questions
propounded to the Court. The subject matter of the inquiry was
the proposed severance tax act passed by the House and under consideration in the Senate. The questions propounded called for decisions on close and intricate issues involving the validity of the
tax and the distribution of the proceeds under the Old Age Pension
Amendment and Article X, Section 3, of the State Constitution,
'93 Colo. 400, 26 P. 2d 1051. See also Moffit v. Pueblo, 55 Colo. 112, 133 P. 754.
1Denver City Railway Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 41 P. 826, 52 Am. St. Rep.
239, 29 L.R.A. 608; Parsons v. People, 32 Colo. 221, 76 P. 666; Colo. Nat. Life
Assur. Co. v. Clayton, 54 Colo. 256, 130 P. 330; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. School
District, 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260; Hollenbeck v. Denver, 97 Colo. 370, 49 P. 2d 435.
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and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
Said the Court, 9 in denying the request, and alluding to the
intricacies of the questions involved. ". . . since the matter comes
before our Court as an original proceeding, we are deprived of the
aid and assistance of competent counsel generally prevailing in
instances where we are called upon to review litigated causes."
After pointing out the dangers and uncertainties of pronouncing
judgment after only ex parte consideration, the Court said: "As a
general proposition we seriously doubt the wisdom of prejudging
involved legal problems and fundamental constitutional interpretations in ex parte proceedings of this nature, and it has been, and
is, the policy of our Court to accommodate the legislature only in
such cases as are clear and wherein no possible prejudice to anyone may later result."
In view of the complexity of the questions propounded and
the very real danger of affecting private rights without adequate
consideration in an ex parte proceeding, the reluctance of the Court
to pass on the questions is understandable and quite consistent with
the caution usually exercised by courts in deciding constitutional
questions, even in adverse proceedings. The policy was as recently
reaffirmed by the Court as in 1954 when the Court refused to pass
on a question of constitutionality saying that the power of courts
to declare legislative enactments invalid because of constitutional
limitations involves a great responsibility, and is to be exercised
with caution and reluctance. 10
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
DECREES

Caution and reluctance to decide constitutional issues were not
the order of the day in the decision of Minnear v. Minnear 11 in
which the Court held unconstitutional, as being repugnant to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United
States, the Colorado statute providing for the manner of enforcement of foreign divorce, separate maintenance, annullment, or
support decrees. The statute involved (Section 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S.)
provides that the courts of this State "shall have power to enforce the decrees, judgments and orders of other states or jurisdictions made pursuant to statutes similar to this statute, or amend
the same, or enter new orders, to the same extent and in the same
manner as though such decrees, judgments and orders were entered in the courts of this state."
Plaintiff was divorced from his wife in 1950 in Florida. The
decree ordered the plaintiff here to pay, as a property settlement,
permanent alimony as long as his wife remained unmarried or as
9In Re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate, Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv.
Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 10; Not Reported in P 2d.
"0Higgins v. Sinnock, 129 Colo. ,66, 266 P. 2d 1112 (1954).
11Colorado Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 9; 281 P. 2d 517.
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long as plaintiff remained on duty in the Navy as a naval aviator.
Plaintiff began an action in the District Court in Denver alleging
that the property settlement was obtained by the defendant wife
through trickery, fraud, deceit, undue influence and overreaching;
and plaintiff prayed for an order setting aside the property settlement. Service was obtained upon the defendant in San Francisco. She appeared by attorney who filed a motion to dismiss for
the reason "that this court does not have jurisdiction." The motion
was sustained and the cause dismissed. Plaintiff sought review on
writ of error from the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the appearance of the defendant was a general appearance and that the trial court should not have dismissed
the complaint for want of jurisdiction, but that the error was not
reversible because the statute providing that the courts of this
State may vacate or modify foreign judgments was in violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, Section 1) of the
Constitution of the United States.
A better case could hardly be found to demonstrate the dangers of deciding questions without the benefit of adverse treatment
by counsel. It is to be noted that the constitutional question of
Full Faith and Credit was not raised, argued, or decided in the
trial court. It was not raised or argued in the brief of the plaintiff
in error in the Supreme Court, and the defendant in error did not
appear in the Supreme Court. Contrary to the reluctance of the
Court expressed in In Re Interrogatories,above to pass upon a
constitutional issue on only ex parte consideration, here we find
the Court boldly undertaking to strike down a statute without any
brief or argument whatsoever. The opinion contains not a single
citation of authority from any court from which we can determine
the source of the Court's conclusion. We are simply told that "The
power of the legislature to fix and determine the jurisdiction of
our courts is subject to the restriction thus imposed by the federal
Constitution. To abide this restriction our courts are open for the
recognition and enforcement of valid foreign judgments, and not
to declare a judgment of another state, in full force and effect for
a number of years, totally void, as is here attempted." And further, "For the reasons herein indicated, we determine section
46-4-1, '53 C.R.S., to be unconstitutional as in violation of the full
faith and credit clause of the federal constitution, and therefore
this, or any other proceeding initiated thereunder for the purposes attempted in the instant case, cannot be effective and should
be dismissed."
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has come under interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United States many times. The
established rule is that "the duly attested record of the judgment
of a state is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within
the United States as it has by law or usage in the state from which
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it is taken. ' 12 Under such a rule, Full Faith and Credit does not
absolutely prohibit the courts of Colorado from modifying or
vacating a Florida judgment incorporating a property settlement,
as our Court flatly held in Minnear v. Minnear, but rather requires Colorado to give the Florida judgment the same faith and
credit which the courts of Florida would give it. We must, then,
inquire into the action which Florida courts may take with respect
to a Florida judgment confirming a property settlement.
The case of Cohn v. Mann 13 seems to be the case nearest in
point decided by the Supreme Court of Florida among the numerous times the question has arisen in that State.1"
In Cohn v. Mann, the plaintiff petitioned for modification of
a final divorce decree which contained the following: "Ordered,
Adjudged and Decreed that the release and property settlement
executed by the parties hereto be, and the same is hereby confirmed, and each of the parties is hereby directed to comply with
all of the terms thereof, subject to a further order of this Court."
Specifically, the defendant ex-spouse had by the agreement given
up all her interest in certain property in return for petitioner's
agreement to pay her $75 per week permanent alimony. Petitioner
sought, in the subsequent action, a modification of the weekly payments on the ground that his financial status had "become so
materially and substantially altered as to render the further payment of the weekly payments of $75 pursuant to the provisions
of said agreement and decree wholly impossible." Petitioner set
up Section 65.15, F.S., 1941, F.S.A. as authority for the court to
modify the property settlement.
In reversing the trial courts' dismissal of the petition, the
Supreme Court of Florida said in an unanimous opinion:
The prior decisions construing the statutory provision are as follows:
"We have authority, under Fla. Stat. 1941, Sec. 65.15,
F.S.A., to modify alimony allowances, whether based on
stipulation and decree or upon decree that rests solely on
testimony." Fowler v. Fowler, 159 Fla. 100, 31 So. 2d 162.
"Where the parties have, by mutual agreement, settled their differences by compromise and the court has ratified the same in the final decree, a strong showing is required to modify the terms thereof." Webber v. Webber.
156 Fla. 396, 23 So. 2d 388.
"When a property settlement provides for an agreed
sum or sums to be paid the wife in lieu of her right to
participate in her husband's property, it will take a very
"Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 58 S. Ct. 454, 82 L. Ed. 649 (1938); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R.
413 (1943); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903, 91 L. Ed. 1133 (1947).
13---Fla-....38 So. 2d 465 (1949).
14See also Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128; Haynes v. Haynes, 71
So. 2d 491 (1954); and other cases cited in the text.
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strong case even in view of Chapter 16780 to modify it."
Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128.
We find that the Chancellor erred in dismissing the
petition. It is not without equity.
It appears from the cases that the Supreme Court of Florida
will order the modification or vacation of a property settlement
agreement upon a showing that the agreement was the product of
fraud or overreaching 15 or, as in Cohn v. Mann, that materially
changed circumstances of the parties dictate modification as a
matter of equity. It follows that if Colorado is to give the Florida
judgment such faith and credit "as it has by law or usage in the
state from which it is taken," the plaintiff in Minnear v. Minnear
should have been given his opportunity to establish by proof his
allegations that the property settlement was obtained by fraud,
deceit and overreaching-the same opportunity which the courts
of Florida would have afforded him.
To aid it in the construction of statutes in constitutional law
cases, the Supreme Court ordinarily adheres to well-established
rules of construction.
The first such rule is that courts are not at liberty to hold a
statute unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. Often the rule as
stated by the Court provides that an act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and will be held repugnant to the constitutions
be so, clearly, plainly, palpably, and beyond
only if it appears to
16
a reasonable doubt.
The second such rule is that if a statute is capable of two
constructions, one of which would render it invalid and the other
construction which will uphold the statute must be
valid, the
17
adopted.
It must be conceded that the statute here involved is ambiguous. But ambiguity should not be an excuse for avoiding construc71 So. 2d 491 (1954).
Haynes v. Haynes- ____Fla.....
Oil Co. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202 P. 1.80; Reid v. Colorado, 187
U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108; People v. Morgan, 79 Colo. 504; People v.
Rucker, 5 Colo. 455; Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 155, 2 P. 894; Carpenter v.
People, 8 Colo. 116, 5 P. 828; People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929; Denver
v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 30 P. 1041, 17 L.R.A. 135; Newman v. People, 23 Colo.
300, 47 P. 278; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hummer, 36 Colo. 208, 84 P. 61; Union
Pac. R. Co. v. DeBusk, 12 Colo. 294, 20 P. 752; Bd. of Commissioners v. Irr.
Dist., 56 Colo. 515, 139 P. 546; Post Printing & Pub. Co. v. Denver, 68 Colo. 50,
189 P. 39; Mitchell v. People, 76 Colo. 346, 232 P. 685, 40 A.L.R. 566; Broadbent
v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 P. 852; U. S. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. McClelland,
95 Colo. 292, 36 P. 2d 164; Rinn v. Bedford, 102 Colo. 475, 84 P. 2d 827; Amer.
Fed. of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145, 160 A.L.R. 873; Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P. 2d 213; Watrous v. Golden Chamber of
Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P 2d 498; Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf Club, 126
Colo. 471, 251 P. 2d 926.
IT C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. School Dist., 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260; Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174, 19 P. 2d 197; Ludlow v. People, 92 Colo. 195, 19 P. 2d 210;
Kimble v. People, 92 Colo. 197, 19 P. 2d 208; People ex rel. Park Res. Co.
v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P. 2d 894; Robinson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
99 Colo. 150, 60 P. 2d 927.
16Altitude
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tion of legislative intent. And in the search for legislative intent,
the Colorado cases tell us that we must start with the presumption
that the statute is consistent with the Constitution and must be
so construed unless it is plainly, palpably and beyond a reasonable
doubt repugnant to the Constitution.
Section 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S., in the first paragraph, can be read
as conferring jurisdiction upon Colorado courts to enforce foreign
judgments and to "amend, modify, set aside and make new orders
as the court may find necessary and proper" to the same extent
that Colorado courts have jurisdiction in other similar actions
arising in Colorado. The language quoted above can, without doing
violence to the context, be read to mean that the Colorado courts
may, when "necessary and proper," in light of what the foreign
law dictates, "amend, modify, set aside and make new orders."
The second paragraph of the statute seems to be the principal basis
for our Court's determination that Colorado courts have power,
substantively, to disregard a foreign judgment. But the second
paragraph, by its terms, gives our courts power to modify judgments of sister states only "where the action originated in this
state" and consequently was not involved in Minnear v. Minnear.
Then, too, it must be remembered that it is a reciprocal law
we are construing and the power of Florida courts under the
Florida statutes is the same as the power of Colorado courts under
Colorado law. That being so, a statute which authorizes Colorado
courts to treat a foreign judgment the same way they would treat
a Colorado judgment in effect authorizes the Colorado courts to
treat a Florida judgment the same way the Florida courts would
treat their own judgments.
The statute is susceptible of an interpretation which would
render it constitutional. Despite its ambiguity, Section 46-4-1, '53
C. R. S. can hardly be said to be violative of the Constitution
plainly, palpably, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps the result in Minnear v. Minnear would have been
different had the Court waited to decide the case until the authorities for and against validity of the statute could have been argued
by counsel.
In Potter v. Potter,8 decided before Minnear v. Minnear, in
an opinion by the Chief Justice which reflects careful study and
research, the Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not require the courts of Colorado to enforce a judgment of the
State of Texas which, by the law of Texas, is not final. The law
is well settled that it is only final judgments which must be given
full faith and credit, and that the faith and credit which one state
must give the judgments of another state is the same credit which
the state of origin would give its own judgment. The controlling
authorities are adequately set out in the opinion on Potter v. Potter and in footnote 12, above. Minnear v. Minnear could readily
15Colo.

Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, No. 6; 278 P. 2d 1020.
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have been decided consistently with Potter v. Potter, leaving the
parties to win or lose on their evidence, and avoiding the excision
of 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S. from the statute books.
It should be noted in passing that the Court19did adhere to
its usual policy of restraint in Bawman v. People, in which the
conviction of the defendant was questioned. Being charged with
rape, the defendant pleaded "Not guilty by reason of insanity at
the time of the commission of the act and since." No other pleas
were entered. Trial was had on the question of insanity and the
defendant was found sane. Motion for a new trial was made on
the ground that certain evidence was admitted which was hearsay.
The motion was denied and the cause continued for the purpose
of taking evidence prior to sentencing the defendant. At the sentencing hearing motions were filed for permission to withdraw the
plea and to plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,
and to vacate the verdict, which motions were supported by argiment going to the constitutionality of the statutes governing the
procedure for trial of criminal matters in which insanity is pleaded
as a defense. Such motions were denied, evidence was taken, and
the defendant was sentenced. On writ or error, the Supreme Court
reviewed the matter and reversed the conviction because of the
use of hearsay testimony prejudicial to the defendant. The majority of the Court considered the case disposed of on the evidence
issue and never alluded to the constitutional questions. Just why,
we are not told. Perhaps it was because the constitutional issues
were not raised at the proper time, perhaps because courts ordinarily will not decide constitutional questions if a case can be disposed of on other grounds. 20 In either event, we find the Courts
exercising a decree of caution here which was not employed in the
cases of Minnear v. Minnear and Holland v. McAuliffe.
TRIAL PROCEDURE ON DEFENSE OF INSANITY HELD CONSTITUTIONAL

The Court was soon again confronted with the question of the
validity of the statute providing for separate trials on the issues
of guilt and insanity when a defendant pleads both not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity. The statute, 39-8-2-3, and 4, provided, insofar as it applies in the present case, that a defendant
who pleads both not guilty and joins therewith a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity shall be committed to a psychopathic hospital
for observation, and shall be tried first on the issue raised by the
plea of not guilty, in which trial "he shall be conclusively presumed
to have been sane at the time the alleged offense was committed";
then, if found guilty, the defendant shall be tried on the issue of
11Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 1; 274 P. 2d 591.
DeVotie v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 23 P. 980; Platte Land Co. v. Hubbard, 30
Colo. 40, 69 P. 514; Gale v. Statler, 47 Colo. 72, 105 P. 318; People v. Pirie, 78
Colo. 361, 242 P. 72; Mtn. St. Beet Growers' Mkt. Ass'n. v. Monroe, 84 Colo. 300,
269 P. 886; People v. Texas Co., 85 Colo. 289, 275 P. 896; People v. Dist. Ct., 87
Colo. 316, 287 P. 849; Flanders v. Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P. 2d 980; Elliott v.
People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P. 2d 500; Lipset v. Davis, 119 Colo. 335, 203 P. 2d 730.
2
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insanity, either before the same or a new jury, in the discretion of
the court; and if found both guilty and sane the defendant shall be
sentenced according to law.
In Leick v. People,21 the defendant was tried first on the plea
of not guilty and the jury returned the verdict of guilty. The jury
was permitted to separate, was reassembled, and in the trial of
the defendant on the insanity issue, returned a verdict finding the
defendant legally sane. On writ of error, the defendant urged
reversal on numerous grounds, three of which the Court considered: (1) that the statute is unconstitutional which fixes procedures for the trial of criminal cases in which a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity is entered by the defendant; (2) that error
was committed in giving certain instructions; and (3) the admission of certain hearsay testimony. Counsel for defendant specifically urged that the procedure violated the due process clauses of
both the State and Federal Constitutions because of the conclusive
presumption of sanity prevailing in the trial of the guilt of the
defendant, and because of the prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the trial of guilt first and the trial of insanity later to the
same jury which had previously heard the full details surrounding
the offense charged.
The record in the case indicated that the jurors were not informed that any presumption, conclusive or otherwise, was to be
indulged by them concerning the sanity of the defendant. Defense
counsel offered testimony of expert and other witnesses on insanity of the defendant and all testimony was received. The
record shows that no evidence offered by defendant bearing upon
his mental condition, and consequently his capacity to premeditate
and formulate the necessary intent, was rejected by the trial court.
The trial court had obviously followed the rule earlier laid down
by the Supreme Court 22 to the effect that application of the statute
to prevent admission of any evidence which a defendant might
have bearing on his ability to deliberate and form the intent to
murder would be a denial of due process of law. The Court held
that it was not the procedure designated by the statute but rather
the procedure actually followed by the trial court which should
determine if defendant's rights had been taken away without due
process. And since the defendant was permitted to make his total
defense, including the consideration of defendant's sanity, in the
first trial, he was not deprived of his life or liberty without due
process. The decision on this matter is well documented by the
Court in its opinion, and many other United States Supreme Court
opinions support the conclusion of the Court that "When considering the question as to whether procedures conducted under statutory authority were such as to deny due process of law to the
accused in a criminal case, we are concerned only with the facts as
Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 9; 281 P. 2d 806.
-2Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. 2d 1112.
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they actually happened and not with speculations upon what conceivably might have taken place under the authority of the act."
The Court also adhered to its previous decisions 23 holding
that statutory separation of the trials on the two issues involvedguilt and sanity-and trial of both issues to the same jury were not
without due process of law.
As it happened, the Court did not need to decide the constitutional issues in this case, since the conviction was reversed for
errors in the giving of instructions and in the admission of evidence. But the Court no doubt felt compelled to express its views
concerning the statute because of the frequency and vigor of the
attacks being made upon it, and because of the apparent need for
guidance of counsel and the trial court on re-trial of the case. The
Court considered the question of the validity of the statute important enough to order oral argument of the matter, allotting one
hour each to the State and the defendant.
For the further guidance of counsel and courts the Supreme
Court volunteered, by way of dicta, two further principles which
merit consideration here. First, a refusal on the part of a trial
court to admit defendant's evidence of mental derangement or
insanity in the trial of the defendant's guilt "would be a denial of
due process of law." And, second, referring to the statutory provision which reads "A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the
commission of the offense charged," the Court said, "As indicated
by the specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Holland in
Bauman v. People, supra, we doubt the validity of this provision,
."
The General Assembly, taking its cue from the decisions,
has modified the statutes 24 to permit the taking of testimony going to the defendant's incapacity to formulate intent or deliberate
in the trial of guilt, to eliminate the conclusive presumption of
guilt in the trial of the insanity issue, and to require trial on the
insanity issue prior to the trial on the issues raised by the plea of
not guilty.

CRIMINAL LAW
V. G. SEAVY of the Pueblo Bar

The cases which form the content of this review are those
found in Volume 7 of the advance sheets published by the Colorado
Bar Association, numbers 1 through 13.
Cases decided during this period dealing with the criminal
law are not numerically great, and there is little that falls without the category of reaffirmation. The writer has attempted, with
no great degree of success, to divide the cases into the two categories of procedure and substantive law. Some cases belong in
Ingles v. People, supra; Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P. 2d 987.
11Session Laws, 1955, Ch. 118.
13
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neither, and others belong in both. But perhaps the division is
warranted when the other known alternative would be to list the
cases numerically.
PROCEDURE

The most worthy subject of comment in a review of our criminal law of this past year are the repeated admonitions, suggestions,
and criticisms which the Court has made regarding the procedure
which should be followed when before it upon writ of error.
Although the Court, as it expressed in many of the cases here
under consideration, will overlook procedural shortcomings upon
the writ when it deems the merits of sufficient importance, this at
most is a hazardous position inasmuch as there is not always a
meeting of the minds in this regard between Court and counsel.
In the case of Will v. People,' the writ of error was dismissed
because of failure to present assignments of error, failure to present a record which contained objections to evidence of which the
defendant complained, and failure to note exceptions. Mr. Justice
Alter concludes by saying, "The record in this case is fatally defective; in disregard of all rules of criminal procedure, and does
not properly present any question for our determination."
The same Justice in Leonard McRae v. People,- made the following statement:
At the outset we call attention to the fact that our
court rules with reference to assignments of error, abstracts and briefs in criminal cases have been wholly disregarded in the instant case ... There is in the record in
our Court no abstract. We also call attention to the fact
that in criminal cases the rules of civil procedure adopted
by our Court, effective April 6, 1941, contain an express
provision that "Criminal procedure in the Supreme Court
shall be under the practice heretofore existing (order
of Supreme Court January 6, 1951)." The rules effective
in criminal cases require the filing of assignments of error
at the time of the filing of the record; fifteen copies of an
abstract of record, and printed briefs.
Such comments should provide a yellow light for all those
seeking review on writ of error. The legislature amended 39-7-24
and 39-7-27 of '53 C.R.S. dealing with writs of error in capital
and non-capital cases so that the distinguishing feature of tile
two sections is now the imposition of the death sentence.'
What would have been the principal criminal case decided in
the past year is now largely of only academic interest. Luckily, the
perplexities and confusion surrounding the procedure in insanity
cases, preserved by the current decision of Leick v. People,4 have
I Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 5, pg. 156; 278 P. (2d) 178.
2Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 9, pg. 280; 281 P. (2d) 153.
3S.B. 104, approved April 15, 1955.
7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 9, pg. 297; 281 P. (2d) 806
4Vol.
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been somewhat alleviated by legislative amendment. 5 The defendant entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of
insanity" to the charge of murder. He was tried and convicted
upon his "not guilty" plea and the jury fixed the penalty at death.
Two days later the same jury convened to find him sane upon trial
of his other plea. The question of the applicable statutes' constitutionality was raised, but the majority of the Court refused to
pass thereon. The contention was made that since defendant was
"conclusively presumed" to be sane upon the trial under his "not
guilty" plea (as provided by statute) he was denied due process
of law. But the Court found that voluminous evidence upon his
mental condition-including sanity-was introduced, and under
the well known maxim of constitutional law as applied to criminal
cases, the test is what was actually done, not what could have been
done.
Moreover, the Court stated that it would have been a denial
of due process had the trial court refused this evidence of mental
condition, including sanity, not for the purpose of guilt or innocence, but as bearing upon defendant's ability to deliberate "and
form the intent essential to murder in the first degree," citing
Ingles v. People.6 Judge Holland's comment in his specially concurring opinion indicated that he was "amazed at the adroitness with
which the majority of this Court still eschew the question of constitutionality of statutes that are constantly dogging the trail of
murder trials involving the procedure under pleas of insanity."
The cause was, however, reversed upon two other grounds.
An instruction as to what the jury should consider in regard to
evidence of mental condition was found contradictory, and error
was committed when testimony as to defendant's mental condition
was given by a psychiatrist who had observed and examined him.
The testimony was given during the People's case in chief in violation of 39-8-2, '53 C.R.S.. The ruling is important in that this
section stands unamended by the legislature.
There were two specially concurring opinions, one, as mentioned before, by Justice Holland, who made reference to his dissent in the Bauman case,' the other by Justice Clark who determined the statutes to be constitutional, and also apprised the
majority that in his opinion Battalino v. People 8 had modified the
rule of Ingles v. People, supra. Perhaps the trial judge had in mind
the Battalino case and its distinction between mental condition and
insanity when he gave the erroneous instruction, and while it still
may be considered somewhat contradictory, it does not reach that
degree of contradiction to which the majority attribute it.
The important amendments to the insanity procedure statutes
omit the "conclusive presumption of sanity" provision when the
H.B. 491, approved April 14, 1955.
'92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109. (1933).
'Bauman v. People, Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 30, 274 P. (2d)
118 Colo. 587, 199 P. (2d) 897 (1S48).
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proper plea has not been made, and the admission of guilt when
only the insanity plea has been made. They have provided that
the defendant must make an insanity plea if he is to rely on insanity as a defense; that evidence of mental condition is to be
admissible with reference to proving or disproving specific intent;
that when the insanity plea is joined with others, the issue of insanity is first tried or all are tried together, and that defendant
may demand separate trials, and, finally that when issues are tried
separately they are tried to different juriesY Whether the new
procedure will eliminate the frustrations of that which the Leick
case was determinative, only time will tell. It is to be wondered
whether the simplicity of pre-1927 procedure when everything
came in under the "not guilty" plea has not in retrospect proved
more worthy than was its alleged principal evil of the People's inability to prepare.
Other cases dealing with procedure have not been so arduous.
In People v. Gomez, 10 the Court was called upon in a review initiated by the People under the provisions of 39-7-27, '53 C.R.S. to
approve or disapprove the action of the trial court in directing a
verdict for the defendant. During the course of the trial and at the
conclusion of the opening statement made by the District Attorney,
the defendant moved for a directed verdict which was granted on
the ground that nothing was stated in the "opening statement
which would constitute a charge against the defendant." The
Supreme Court disapproved the lower court's action, finding (1)
it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to make an opening statement; (2) that the opening statement was in fact "sufficient to
entitle the District Attorney to introduce evidence in support of
the burglary charge", and (3) it was error to deny the District
Attorney leave to amend his statement upon his request to do so.
Three principal contentions were made in Hawkins v. People,"
which went to the Supreme Court after defendant had plead guilty
to and was sentenced for a crime against nature. Plaintiff in error
first contended that the trial judge erred in not considering probation. At the time of taking defendant's plea the trial court indicated that defendant had a right to apply for probation even
though the court was not disposed to grant the same in this type
case. However, the defendant failed to make application therefor,
and thus was in no position to claim error upon this point. The
defendant next contended that it was mandatory that the trial
court order a psychiatric examination under Art. 19, Ch. 39, '53
C.R.S. The Court stated that this is discretionary with the trial
court, for the examination is necessary only if the court proceeds
under the mentioned statute in committing defendant to an instition for a sentence of one day to life. Here the trial court elected
to proceed under the regular statute defining the offense.
I0Supra,

note 5.
' Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 11, pg. 386; 283 P. (2d) 949.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 8, pg. 269; 281 P. (2d) 156.
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Lastly, it was contended that the guilty plea was made involuntarily, which contention the record did not support, and that
evidence taken after the plea was insufficient to prove the corpus
delecti. But this is not the purpose of the taking of testimony in
this regard, said the high Court, but rather its purpose is to apprise the sentencing judge of mitigating or aggravating circumstances 12to guide him in imposing sentence, citing Champion v.
People.
A dismissal of an appeal to it from the County Court was
made by the District Court of Huerfano County and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Naranjo v. People." A conviction was had
against the defendant in the County Court for killing deer out of
season and related offenses. This being a criminal case it came
squarely within the provision of section 176, chapter 46, '35 C.S.A.,
which prohibits certain type criminal appeals to the District Court
and provides for appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court.
In People v. Griffith,1 4 it was held that the jurisdiction of the
county court over the person of the defendant was not "impaired
by the manner in which accused is brought before it."'
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that he was arrested without a
warrant, and was not taken immediately before a magistrate.
Other findings of jurisdictional validity were determined, and the
Court reversed the action of the court below in dismissing for lack
of jurisdiction.
With reference to defendant's unsuccessful contentions, this
is perhaps a proper place to interpose the following legislative
addition designated as 39-2-20, '53 C.R.S.
Any provision in this chapter prior to the effective
date of this act to the contrary notwithstanding, an arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person, without warrant, for a criminal offense committed in his presence; and by an officer, when a criminal offense has in fact
been committed, and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.I G
There were two cases before the Supreme Court during the
past year which dealt with bonds. The decision in Trujillo v. District Court of the County of Weld 67 ordered a bond reinstated.
The defendant had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter
and without a request by the sureties or the District Attorney the
court remanded petitioner to the custody of the sheriff and discharged the bondsmen, denying petitioner's motion that bond be
continued until disposition of motion for new trial. It was the
policy of the trial court to follow such procedure in all cases of
1"124 Colo. 253, 236 P. (2d) 127 (1951).
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 22; 274 P. (2d) 607.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 3, pg. 110; 276 P. (2d) 559.
522 C.J.S., pg. 236, section 144.
,6S.B. 251, approved April 9, 1955.
" Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 10, pg. 328; 282 P. (2d) 703.
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felony and manslaughter convictions. The error was that the
court's policy was in contravention of the discretionary provisions
in regard to bond continuances of 39-2-19, '53 C.R.S.
The second case, Allison v. People v. Adamson iS was also disposed of by a reversal, with two Justices dissenting. The interesting facts of the case making it one of first impression warrant a
somewhat lengthy comment. The defendant was at liberty on bond
pending trial for burglary. While at liberty he was convicted and
sentenced for a felony in California, and thus could not appear on
the date set for trial. The plaintiffs in error here entered into a
contract with the surety on the bond to indemnify it in case of
forfeiture-which was the result in the trial court. Thus, since
the surety did not seek review the indemnitors did.
The Court found indemnitors to be proper parties, then found
the lower court in error in its ruling of forfeiture. All due diligence and good faith surrounded the acts of both surety and indemnitors. The Court rejected the reasoning of one line of authority which holds relief should be granted only when the "undertaking has been rendered impossible or excusable (a) by an act
of God; (b) by an act of the obligee; or (c) by an act of law." 19
Rather, it adopted the rule that since the plaintiffs in error were
totally unable to bring defendant back, their plight is the same
were defendant dead or confined to bed 20by illness, thus bringing
the case under Western Surety v. People.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW

The first case appearing in this volume of the advance sheets
which dealt with the substantive law was People v. Gallegos.2 The
defendant was found not guilty of the charge of aggravated robbery. The people sought a reversal of the judgment under section
500, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A.
The facts were not in serious dispute and established that
defendant with the aid of a gun demanded and received wages
owing him from his employer. The Court affirmed on the basis of
Analytis v. People.23 The writer of the opinion defined animus
furandi as "a latih phrase which generally may be translated as
intent to steal, that is, a criminal intent to feloniously deprive an
owner of his property." Since there was no serious dispute as to
the fact that this money was owing him, this element was lacking,
and thus the not guilty judgment below was correct.
An interesting factor in this review was that the People were
"seeking a reversal of the judgment," and not merely an approval
or disapproval. The section mentioned expressly prohibits double
jeopardy in its application. Here the People were apparently go"sVol. 7, C.B.A. Ad Sh. No. 13, pg. 468; 286 P. (2d) 1102.
"State T. Pelley, 222 N. C. 684, 24 S.E. (2d) 635. (1943).
2120
Colo. 357, 208 P. (2d) 1164 (1949).
nPeople v. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 Pac. 329 (1918).
'Vol.
2368

7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 21; 274 P.

Colo. 74, 188 Pac. 1113 (1920).

(2d)

608.

Nov.-Dec., 1955

DICTA

ing on the theory that even though the direction was made at the
conclusion of all the evidence, the direction was made by the court
solely on legal principles, the trial being to the court without a
jury. It would have been interesting to see whether a new trial
would have been ordered had the ruling been opposed to the trial
court's action.
4
Another affirmance was ordered by the Court in Roll v. People.2
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit the crime
of confidence game, and acquitted upon a substantive count charging confidence game. The rulings of the Court upon defendant's
contentions were for the most part based upon findings that the
trial court had not abused its discretion, (a) in endorsing at the
time of trial a witness who was a principal but had changed his
plea, (b) in permitting the same witness to testify when he remained in the court room for a short period of time after the rule
of exclusion had been invoked, but without the knowledge or consent of the District Attorney, and (c) in admitting a confession
which was alleged to be involuntary, the court having followed
the procedure in regard thereto as directed in Dozvney v. People.2
Although the question was not properly before it, the Court
also held that a conviction was properly returned upon the conspiracy count even though an acquittal was returned on the substantive charge. The Court found sufficient evidence of a plan,
scheme and design to cheat and swindle.
Justice Knauss, who wrote the opinion in Roll, supra, also
was the author of Hood v. People,-' which rejected the contentions
of plaintiff in error who had been convicted under the indecent
libertv statute.
The Court could find no error in permitting the victim, a girl
of nine years, to testify. Before permitting her to take the stand
the trial judge interrogated her at length to determine her qualifications and determined from her answers that she was qualified.
Nor was error committed in the introduction of similar offenses
when properly limited by instruction, and testimony as to the
silence of the defendant while under arrest was not prejudicial,
as "the admission of evidence which cannot have influenced the
27
jury, is harmless.1
The Court also held that it was not error in submitting only
one form of not guilty verdict to the jury covering the entire information when three guilty forms were given. The defendant
was charged in four counts: (1) assault coupled with the taking
of indecent liberties; (2) enticing or alluring into some place for
the purpose of taking such indecent liberties; (3) taking indecent
liberties, and (4) attempting to take such indecent liberties. Count
two was dismissed, and defendant was found guilty on count three.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 11, pg. 398; 284 P. (2d) 665.
121 Colo. 307, 215 P. (2d) 892 (1950).
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 4, pg. 133; 277 P. (2d) 223.
McQueary v. People, 48 Colo. 214, 110 Pac. 210 (1910).
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The Court stated the District Attorney charged separate phases
of the same act in the four counts, and the jury was instructed
that it should not consider count four "unless it found defendant
not guilty of one or both of the offenses set forth in counts one
and three."
It is difficult to see how the jury could have found defendant
not guilty of any of the single offenses under the not guilty form
of verdict given to it. The Court, however, reasoned that since a
proper verdict upon one count was returned, there was no error.
Apparently the jury's common sense, and not proper legal procedures, form the basis of this affirmance.
The opinion undoubtedly paraphrased the counts of the information to a large extent. It should be remembered that "indecent and improper" liberties under the first offense of the statute
is not synonymous with "immodest, immoral and indecent" liberties under the second, third, and fourth offenses of the statute,
and a conviction upon taking "indecent and improper" liberties not
coupled with an assault is not proper.'-"
There were four cases decided which dealt primarily with
criminal evidence. The first of these, Bauman v. People,'9 was
reversed because prejudicial hearsay was admitted. A psychiatrist
gave evidence of the result of a staff meeting. This brought the
30
case squarely within the rule pronounced in Carter v. People.
Mr. Justice Holland filed a lengthy dissent which has already been
noted concerning the insanity procedures, and he also made comment in regard to prejudicial remarks made by the District Attorney as to punishment which the majority stated was corrected by
instruction. It is his view that such instructions are of doubtful
value in removing from the minds of the jury prejudicial remarks
of this type.
The case of Baney v. People 1 dealt with the res gestae rule.
The defendent was convicted of forcible rape, and the conviction
was reversed with order to discharge the defendant. Testimony
of what the complaining witness had related to law enforcement
officers some ten to fourteen hours following the alleged attack
was ruled hearsay and without the res gestae exception. After
citing Graves v. People,32 which quoted from Wharton as follows:
Res gestae are events speaking for themselves through the
instinctive words and acts of participants, not 33the words
and acts of participants when narrating events.
the Court determined that the testimony related only narrations
of fact, and was therefore hearsay.
The rule of circumstantial evidence was determinative of
Kidder v. People, 115 Colo. 72, 169 P. (2d) 181 (1946).
-Supra, note 7.
119 Colo. 342, 204 P. (2d) 147 (1949).
Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 3, pg. 84; 275 P. (2d) 195.
18 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 63 (1893).
Wharton, Crirn. Ev. sec. 262, 9th ed.

Nov.-Dec., 1955

DICTA

the ruling ordering the defendant discharged. The facts and
circumstances "were not such as were incompatible with the innocence of the defendant and incapable of explanation upon any
'3
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of defendant.
5
L. McRae v. People,3 presents perhaps what is new law. The
defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated robbery. It
was his contention in the Supreme Court that error was committed in the introduction of testimony of an admission against interest into evidence which related the fact that accused had informed the officers while under arrest that he had once been in
the penitentiary. The statement was made to the officers in explanation of his possession of a money order and currency.
The Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, held that if
any of the admission comes in that it comes in in toto. It was also
held that if it were admitted for purposes of attacking credibility,
it would have been error for the defendant had not taken the
witness stand.
However, the Court emphasized the voluntariness of the admission and stated the rule to be the same in written or oral confessions. Two eai.ly cases were cited by the Court in this regard
to support its conclusion.30 But if the Court has adopted the rule
must be voluntary, it has in
that both confessions and admissions
37
effect overruled Bruner v. People.
That opinion, which was by the same author, stated, "However,
if the statement is not a confession, the question as to its voluntarity is unimportant." It also quoted Abbot as follows:
A declaration made by one accused of a crime, denying any criminal act and explaining suspicious circumstances for his own advantage, is not a confession, and
that confessions must be
does not come within the rule
3
voluntary to be admissible.
Two decisions concerning the same defendant were handed
down as Miles v. People.39 The first allowed the record to be supplemented by the introduction of carbon copies of a confession
which had been lost, there appearing no reason to doubt the authenticity of the copies. The second case dealt with the law surrounding the confessions.
It was held that the proper procedure as outlined by Downey
v. People,40 was followed here. The trial court held a preliminary
hearing during which it concluded that the evidence was not suf"Beeler v. People, 58 Colo. 451, 146 Pac. 762 (1915).
I2Svpra, note 2.
124 Pac. 742 (1912); Rogers v. People,
6 Potyralski v. People, 53 Colo. 331,
76 Colo. 181, 230 Pac. 391 (1924).
113 Colo. 194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945).
"Abbot, Criminal Trial Brief, sec. 481.
3
'Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 5, pg. 163; 282 P. (2d) 1094. Vol. 7, C.B.A.
Ad. Sh. No. 10, pg. 318; 282 P. (2d) 1096.
,0Supra, note 25.
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ficient to exclude the confession, but that the weight to be given
thereto was for the jury. It was also held that under Schneider v.
People 41 it was proper to admit a joint confession which included
statements regarding similar offenses, as they were restricted by
instruction as evidence only of plan or design.
4 "
In the last case to be mentioned, M. McRae v. People, it
was held that where an irreconcilable conflict in the evidence was
presented it was the sole province of the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. This was a case of manslaughter while
driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol where the blood
alcohol analysis result was very high, and the only testimony as
to what the defendant had had to drink was "one and a half bottles
of 3.2 beer." The instructions as given by the trial court were
found to be without error and the conviction was affirmed with
one Judge dissenting.
In conclusion the writer would like to cite one more legislative
amendment, 40-14-2, '53 C.R.S. relating to obtaining goods under
false pretenses has been amended so that the dividing line between
4
a felony and misdemeanor is now $50.00 instead of $20.00. 3

TAXATION
By KEITH ANDERSON of the Dcnver Bar
DECISIONS

Only two cases dealing with this subject were before the Colorado Supreme Court during the past year. One has application
only to a special class of taxpayers, but the other is of interest to
all property owners.
In Cooper Motors, Inc. v. Board of Jackson County Commissioners, et al.,1 the plaintiff's attorneys asked the court to overrule
City and County of Denver v. Hover Motors, Inc.2 On an agreed
statement of facts, the trial court was presented with the issue
whether automobiles, upon which the specific ownership tax had
been paid, were subject to ad valorem taxes in those situations
where they form a part of a dealer's stock of merchandise. The
trial court, following the rule of law laid down in the Hover ca~e,
held that they were. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the lower court, overruling its holding in the Hover case. With
commendable frankness the court recognized its prior error in
construction of the applicable statute and constitutional provision.
The other case, Weidenhaft v. County Commissioners of El
Paso County, et al.,3 was an attack upon the validity of the statewide reappraisal program as applied to real property. The plain"118 Colo. 543, 199 P. (2d) 873 (1948).
'Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 13, pg. 460; 286 P. (2d) 618.
41S.B. 124, approved April 15, 1955.
'279 P. 2d 685, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
2 121 Colo. 439, 217 P. 2d 863.
3 283 P. 2d 164, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.No. 10.
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tiff, an owner of real property situated in El Paso County, brought
an action against the County Commissioners of said county to
recover the entire 1952 taxes levied upon his property. Since the
allegations made by the plaintiff included charges that the State
Tax Commission was unlawfully usurping the function of the
county assessor and that the statute (137-6-12 1953 C.R.S.) under
which it was acting was unconstitutional, the Attorney General
was permitted to intervene with the result that the Tax Commission, the individual members thereof, and the Attorney General
became parties defendant.
The majority opinion considered that plaintiffs were actually
advancing two theories, the first was that the statute under which
the State Tax Commission was acting was unconstitutional and
invalid, and the second was that the proceedings conducted pursuant thereto were irregular and illegal. On the second issue, the
court expressed the view that the plaintiffs had failed to pursue
their administrative remedies and that the case might be disposed of on this issue alone. However, in view of the insistence
on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel that his entire case was based
upon the invalidity of the law, the court chose to decide the case
upon that issue. In so doing, the court held, with one dissent, that
there could be no present question as to the constitutionality of
the statute; that the statute was sufficiently broad to justify the
Commission in the adoption and application of reasonable standards
essential to bring about a more accurate, equitable and equal original assessment; and that the Tax Commission's action in issuing
a pricing manual and other data and forms which assessors were
directed to use, but which were designed only for aid and assistance
of assessors and as standards by which they might more accurately
appraise property, was not a usurpation of assessors' functions.
LEGISLATION:

The legislature adopted a number of changes in the statutes
relating to taxation, which are probably of more continuing interest than these cases.
S. B. 180 amends Subsection 14 of 138-1-12 C.R.S. 1953 by
permitting nonresidents to deduct contributions to Colorado charities in amounts equal to 15% of the income derived from sources
within Colorado, in the case of nonresident individuals, and 5%
of such net income, in the case of nonresident corporations. This
remedied a serious defect in prior law, which permitted deduction
only if ordinarily and necessarily incurred in connection with the
production of Colorado income. Naturally this greatly inhibited
nonresidents from making gifts to Colorado charities.
H. B. 202 continues the 20% credit against the state income
tax which has been in effect for several years to the calendar year
1955 or a fiscal year beginning in 1954 and 1955.
H. B. 459 Subsection (3) of 138-1-39 of C.R.S. 1953 relating
to the period of limitation for refunds of income taxes.
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H.B. 182 effects a substantial revision of the income tax laws
relating to corporate distributions, liquidations and reorganizations, so as to bring them generally in line with the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
H. B. 232 amends the Colorado inheritance tax law so that it
is in conformity with the 1954 Revenue Code with respect to the
credit against the federal estate tax for the inheritance tax paid.
It also requires the filing of a copy of the Federal estate tax return
with the Inheritance Tax Commissioner in every estate where such
a return was filed.
Several other statutes were passed relating to the general
property tax but in general they effected only procedural changes.

PROPERTY LAW
By WILLIAM B. PAYNTER, of the Colorado Bar

(1) BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-USED CAR LOTS AND HOUSE TRAILERS
Cases which deal with building restrictions are Taylor v.
Melton, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, p. 23 and Pagel v. Gisi,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 478. Both involved the question
of the effect of actual notice of building restrictions contained in
an original deed but omitted in subsequent deeds.
In Taylor v. Melton, supra, plaintiffs alleged in substance,
that one Fairley who was the owner of a parcel of land, platted
and subdivided same and a map thereof was filed February 4, 1941,
in the office of the County Clerk and Recorder; that Fairley sold a
portion of the tract to Nesbitts, the deed to which was dated
March 20, 1941, and thereafter recorded and which deed provided
that neither the grantees nor their successors and assigns would
construct a residence on the land of a cost less than $2,500; the
grantor covenanting that he would not build or permit to be built
upon any of the land standing in his name in the particular subdivision, any structure other than a residence of construction value
of not less than $2,500; the above restrictions being a covenant
running with the land and binding upon the grantor, his successors and assigns forever.
It was further alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of certain lots in said Fairley Addition and defendants the owners of
Lot Three thereof; that plaintiffs and defendants respectively
acquired their titles to said lots or parcels of land with notice and
knowledge of the restrictions set forth in the deed to the Nesbitts
and notwithstanding said restrictions, the defendants in February,
1952, planned and commenced and intended to complete a structure to be utilized as a used car lot, in violation of said restrictions.
The trial judge inspected the premises and found thereon a
one room small building used as an office, a number of cars parked
on the lot and the same was being used as a used and new automobile sales lot and that in addition thereto defendants had built
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a cinder block building with a composition roof, being a building
of proper size for a home, but that same had not been completed,
there being no floors or partitions built therein and which was
intended to be used as an office building for the used and new car
lot or as a filling station.
Defendants denied that they had knowledge of any restrictions and alleged that none were contained in the deed conveying
Lot Three to them. The Court found that the defendants purchased
Lot Three with knowledge that there were certain restrictions
which covered the larger portion of the ten acre tract of which said
lot was a portion, both as a result of conversations with Fairley
and constructive notice of said restrictions as set out in the abstract of title.
Among other things the defendants contended that the only
covenant made by a grantee in any deed containing restrictions
was not to build a residence costing less than $2,500 and that this
did not prevent business use of the property; that when the grantor
Fairley provided in the deed to the Nesbitts he would not build
nor permit to be built upon the land retained by him "any structure
other than a residence," subsequent grantees who acquired property without restrictions in their deeds of conveyance were not
bound by Fairley's promise and further that the deed from Fairley
to Nesbitt did not create a restriction against a business use enforceable by those plaintiffs who held lots under deed from Fairley,
which contained no specific restrictions. The lower court found
that the restrictions applied to all property owned by Fairley at
the time of the deed to Nesbitts and that the plain meaning of same
was that no structure other than a dwelling and necessary outbuildings could be constructed, a dwelling being defined in its
ordinary meaning as a house occupied as a residence and that such
restriction would be violated by the uses contemplated by defendants.
The Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the lower court,
held that the common grantor Fairley, imposed the restriction in
question, in pursuance of a general plan for the development and
improvement of all lots included within his plat and further that
the defendants who purchased lots from Fairley subsequent to the
latters deed to the Nesbitts, were bound by the covenant.
The Court, quoting Thompson on Real Property, determined
the applicable rule to be that a subsequent grantee is required to
take notice of a building restriction contained in the original deed
even though such restriction does not appear in the subsequent
deeds and that "Where the deed to the first lot sold, provides for
a building restriction on the grantors other lots in the same subdivision, the purchasers of such other lots will take title subject
to such restrictions."
The case of Pagel v. Gisi, supra, from the District Court of
Yuma County, was a class action brought by plaintiffs to enforce
a general plan of restriction as to the use of the land in Hoch Park
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Addition to the Town of Yuma, Colorado. In their complaint,
plaintiffs alleged that a house trailer parked upon a lot belonging
to defendant, Pagel, violated a restriction that the premises, "will
be used for dwelling houses only and that any dwelling which is
hereafter erected by the party of the second part, his successors
and assigns on this lot to be at a cost of not less than $4,000, or to
be upon plans to be approved by the grantor, his heirs and assigns,
should said dwelling be of less value."
The evidence disclosed that plaintiffs were the owners of lots
the deeds to which contained the restrictions mentioned or that
they were the owners of lots conveyed without written restrictions,
but who recognized and conformed to the general plan of restricted
use.
The trial court found that defendant, Pagel, was fully advised of the restricted conditions concerning the property before
he acquired same and that in addition the general development of
the area disclosed unmistakably that it was being developed for
the use of new permanent homes.
For the reversal of the case it was argued that no general or
specific plan of restrictions was ever shown to exist; that said restrictions were personal to the grantor, Hoch; that the defendant
was using his property for a dwelling house only and because the
restrictions were not contained in his deed, they were not binding
upon him.
The court held that as a general rule the omission of a restrictive covenant contemplated by the general plan of development
of a subdivision, through inadvertence or otherwise, in a conveyance of one of the lots by the subdivider, does not prevent enforcement of the restriction against the immediate grantee of such lot
or his successor in title, if either took with notice of the restriction
or knowledge of the general plan; that there was ample competent
evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the trial court that
the area was being used exclusively for construction of new permanent homes and that a house trailer is not a permanent home,
but "a portable unit designed to be hauled from place to place by
an automobile or truck."
(2) COLORABLE TRANSFERS-RIGHTS OF SPOUSE AND OTHER
PROSPECTIVE HEIRS
In two cases the Supreme Court affirmed the rule of Thuete v.
Thuete, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P. 2d 604, decided in 1953, in which it
was again held that in Colorado, the owner of property has the
right to convey same without the consent or knowledge of the
spouse or other prospective heirs and that the mere fact that such
conveyance will deprive a surviving spouse of the right to inherit
an interest in the property does not make the conveyance fraudulent or invalid; that such deed may be manually delivered to a
third person, with instruction to deliver to the grantee upon the
grantors death and that it is not essential to valid delivery to a
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third person that the grantee know of the existence of the deed
before the grantors death.
In Moedy v. Moedy, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 3, Della
Moedy commenced a divorce action against her husband, Otto in
which she joined as defendant, George 0. Moedy, son of Otto, in
order that the property previously conveyed by Otto to George
might be subjected to her claim for support and maintenance.
During the pendency of the action Otto died and the suit proceeded
against George as grantee in the deed. Della and Otto were married September 17, 1946, at which time Otto owned property near
Fort Collins, rated to have a valuation of approximately $10,000,
which was the subject of the action. In January, 1950, Otto conveyed the property to himself and George in joint tenancy. It
was contended that if the deed was executed by the husband with
intent to deprive the wife of support and right of maintenance it
should be considered a fraud on the wife's rights and void under
Section 17, Chapter 71, 1935, C.S.A., now 59-1-17, 1953, C.R.S.,
providing that every conveyance made with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits
and demands, forfeited debts or demands shall be void. Reliance
was had by the wife on Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128;
24 Colo. 527, 52 Pac. 790, followed in Grover v. Grover, 69 Colo.
72, 169 Pac. 578, in which it was held that where it appears that
the husband's conveyance of his property was colorable merely
and was made with intent to deprive the wife of these benefits, it
is as much of a fraud on the part of the husband as it for a debtor
to put his property beyond his control. The Court in Moedy v.
Moedy said that while the theory as so announced in the Smith
case has not been definitely overruled by our Court, it has been
disapproved by not being followed in Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo.
594, 45 P. 2d 638 and Burton v. Burton., 100 Colo. 567, 569, 69 P.
2d 307. Therefore it would seem that a wife does not stand in
the position of a judgment creditor, and reference is made to
Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363, where the basis of the
present rule was announced, that a husband may dispose of his
property for the express purpose of defeating his wife's right to
maintenance and to share in his estate unless the transaction be
colorable merely, which is defined in Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516,
216 Pac. 257, as being "counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth (Webster) not really intended as a deed."
The question of burden of proof was also involved, it being
contended that plaintiff established a prima-facie case and that
thereupon the burden was on defendant to prove the transaction
was bona fide. The Court held that while such rule may be applied in certain other types of action it was not applicable here.
It pointed out that mental competency was not a issue, that while
it was claimed the deed was a result of undue influence there was
no direct evidence to this effect and that in addition to the rule
which forbids speculating upon the evidence, there is another

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1955

which demands that a deed may be declared void only upon proof
of undue influence, the burden thereof resting upon the one asserting it to prove that the degree of improper influence upon the
grantor sufficient to overcome his will and cause him to do that
which as a free agent he would not have done. In addition to
blood relationship between Otto and George it was contended that
other badges of fraud were that the conveyance was made without
the consent of the wife; that it deprived her of rights to support
and inheritance and that the deed was delivered to a third party
and not the grantee, which, said the Court, are answered adversely
to the wife's position in the recent cases of Thuete v. Thuete, supra,
and Bostron v. Bostron, 128 Colo. 535, 265 P. 2d 230.
Kauffman v. Kauffman, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 5, involved a written contract for the purchase by a son from his
father of irrigated land in Routt County. The purchase price was
$5,600 payable $600 at the time of the execution of the contract
and the balance in five equal annual installments of $1,000 each.
The contract provided that in case of the death of the seller
all payments due thereon should be cancelled and deed delivered
to the purchaser; that in case of death of the purchaser prior to the
full payment of the contract, the seller might pay to the estate of
the purchaser, all payments which had been made by him and upon
such payment the contract should be null and void and of no effect.
The agreement also provided that failure to make one or more
of the payments by the purchaser, or failure in performance of
any covenants to be performed by the purchaser, the agreement
might be terminated at the election of the seller, upon thirty days
notice of intention so to do.
The seller departed this life and suit was filed by the purchaser
against the administratrix of the decedent's estate, who was
purchaser's step-mother and widow of the seller and against the
bank also, for delivery of the deed. It was further alleged that the
purchaser and deceased had entered into verbal modification of
the contract sale to the effect that decedent was to have the use of
the property and pay all expenses incidental to its use in lieu of
the annual payments as provided.
The administratrix filed her answer, in which she alleged that
the execution of the agreement was an attempted testamentary
disposition of property instead of a bona fide agreement; she further denied the alleged modification agreement and alleged that it
was void, since it was not to be performed within one year of
the making thereof, concerned the sale of lands; was not in writing and was not subscribed by the deceased.
Upon the proposition that the contract was in effect a testamentary disposition of the property, the Court again cited Thuete
v. Thuete, supra, and held that the deed having been delivered in
escrow, subject only to the performance of the contract by the
vendee, was irrevocable on the part of the grantor and further
the grantor in the absence of default could not forbid its delivery.
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The Court, further, held that nothing was in the record that even
suggested the transaction was colorable because it was not attended with any circumstance indicative of fraud and the other
elements that make a transaction colorable, such as secrecy and
deprivation of the defendants surviving wife, coupled with a retention of possession and control of the property.
The Court disposed of the proposition that the modification
agreement was void under the statute of frauds by ruling that
the terms of payment under the contract had been fully performed
and that the statute of frauds did not operate against executed
oral contracts, Barnes v. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407, 56 P. 2d 31.
(3)

DEED OF MENTAL INCOMPETENT

In Eaton v. Husher, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, the facts
disclosed that a lunacy complaint was filed in Elbert County Court
against one Hamilton on September 20, 1952; the hearing was not
completed and letters of conservatorship were not issued until November 7, 1952. On October 3, 1952, Hamilton conveyed to the defendants a tract of land in Elbert County in exchange for a small
house in Limon, Colorado and payment of $300 in cash. On December 18, 1952, plaintiff conservator filed suit seeking the cancellation of the deed. The evidence established that the value of the
ranch was $3,475 to $6,675 and the house in Limon from $1,500 to
$3,000. The Court determined that the evidence supported the
conclusions of the trial court, that the consideration was grossly
inadequate; that Hamilton was a mental incompetent and the defendants knew his mental condition and incapacity and that by
their dealing had precluded themselves from having the $300 restored to them, especially in view of the fact that they had disposed of some personal property on the premises. Among other
circumstances in the case it appeared defendants had talked with
the County Judge on October 2, 1952, and he had informed them
of the pending proceeding and that the only way the land could
be sold was by public sale to the highest bidder. It was contended
that a greater burden of proof rested upon plaintiff than is applicable in other civil cases and that the plaintiff had to prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court said such is not the rule in
Colorado citing House v. Smtih, 117 Colo. 305, 187 P. 2d 587.
(4) EASEMENTS-THE OLD LOGGING ROAD
A question of easement was involved in Turner v. Anderson.
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 2, and from reading the opinion of
the Supreme Court it turned principally on questions of fact. In
July, 1937, the Turners who were the owners of some mountain
property in Gilpin County conveyed an irregularly shaped plot of
ground to Anderson with the following provision: "The purchaser
shall have a right to pass in and out through the L. E. Turner
property to state highway No. 72, where designated by L. E.
Turner."
It appeared that about the time of the conveyance, L. E. Tur-
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ner designated what was more or less a roadway, across the Turner property, connecting with the highway. Mrs. Anderson, the
grantee, however, used another road for egress and ingress to the
highway, referred to as the old logging road. At the time of the
conveyance no part of this logging road was on the Turner property; in 1947 the Turners acquired more property including that
on which the old logging road ran and in 1949 they erected a fence
around all of their property, which obstructed a part of said road.
The Supreme Court held that the conveyance spoke for itself
in no uncertain terms, to the effect that plaintiff was to have the
right to pass in and out of defendant's property at such a place as
was to be designated by defendant, L. E. Turner and that at the
time of the conveyance the defendant, Turner, did not own the
tract traversed by the old logging road nor did he own same until
1947, so that there was no adverse use as far as Turner was concerned, except between 1947 and 1949. Mrs. Anderson testified that
she had the right of way across the road which Turner said he designated and that she had the right of way over the old logging road;
in other words, that she had the right to use either or both roadways regardless of any designation. It appeared that some logging
work had been done over the old logging road by former owners
for their own convenience and that it traversed their land only
and that same was occasionally used by hikers, picnic parties, etc.
The Court described the use as irregular, infrequent, sporadic and
far more permissive than adverse and said it required more than
the irregular use which had been made of same, for it to become
a public highway or to vest a prescriptive'right to its use in Mrs.
Anderson.
(5)

LANDLORD AND TENANT

"TRIVIAL" VIOLATIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER NOT
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY; PAYMENT FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES.

Union Oil Company of Californiav. Lindauer, 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 8, involved, not an oil and gas lease, but a lease of
certain lands in part for livestock grazing and part for farming;
the lease provided among other things that the use of the leased
premises was personal to lessees and that they should not allow
the use of all or any part of the leased premises to other parties
without first obtaining the written consent of lessor, provided that
nothing should be construed to preclude the lessees from making
or entering into contracts or agreements for the pasturage of livestock of third parties so long as the livestock were in the exclusive
control of the lessee and further that in the event of the failure or
refusal on the part of lessees to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the lease same should at the option of lessor become
in default and lessor take necessary action to cancel the lease and
retake full possession of the leased premises.
It was alleged that defendants had permitted certain parties to
run sheep on the leased premises for consideration without lessors
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consent. There was no abuse or overgrazing shown and the defendant lessees supervised the grazing operations to some extent,
but not exclusively.
The lower court found that the violations were inconsequential.,
insufficient to work a forfeiture of the lease, and that it would be
unconscionable to forfeit lessees rights on account of violations
shown.
The Supreme Court held that this was an action to terminate
the written lease for violations of its terms; that while defendants
answer was a denial of the violations, no claim was made that the
violations were trivial, but only a denial of any violations charged.
That the plaintiff was within its rights in terminating the lease.
The defendants contended that the action should conform to the
requirements of the forcible entry and detainer statute which would
require a verified complaint, but the Court stated it was not pleaded
as a case in equity and quoted 22 Am. Jur. p. 917, Sec. 13, to the
effect that "Ordinarily, in the absence of express provision or necessary implication, a statutory action of forcible entry and detainer
it not exclusive, but is cumulative with respect to any other remedy
that a party may have." Also that the pleading in the case clearly
indicated that it was instituted under Rule 105, R.C.P. Colo., relating to title and possession of real estate. Judgment for the defendant was reversed. On petition for rehearing this opinion was
adhered to, with a slight modification as to the amount to be paid
into the trial court on account of rentals paid by the defendants
for the unused part of the lease.
Another case of landlord and tenant was Ell and L. Investment
Company v. International Trust Company, et al., 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 12. The leased premises consisted of a two story
building at 17th and Larimer Streets in Denver, constructed about
1890. The lease was for a term of 20 years and provided in substance that the lessors should receive a net annual rental of $750
and that all other expenses of every nature whatsoever in connection with the demised premises including taxes, special improvement assessments, insurance premiums, repairs, alterations and
maintenance, water assessments, heat and light, shall be paid by
the lessee and under no circumstances should the lessors be required or called upon to expend any sum in connection with maintenance of the demised premises during the time thereof.
There was also another provision in the lease that the lessee
would not make any alterations, changes or improvements in the
demised premises of a major nature or which should change or
affect the structural soundness of the demised premises without
first having such alterations, improvements or repairs approved
by the lessor and that the lessor would not in any way be liable for
the expense of making any alterations, improvements or repairs of
any nature whatsoever.
The city building inspector served notice upon the lessor to
vacate the premises unless certain alterations were made, because
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the structure was unsafe, in a dilapidated condition and a fire menace. The question arose as to whether the lessor or lessee should
pay for the structural alterations required by the public authority
to make the building safe. The Court cited various provisions of
the lease and determined that it was evident from the language
employed and the circumstances appearing in the record, that the
general intent of the parties was that the expense of all changes
or repairs, structural, as well as otherwise, in this old building,
devolved upon the tenant.
(6) MECHANICS LIENS-FROM SUBCONTRACTOR TO PRINCIPAL
CONTRACTOR

Barr Lwinber Company v. Thompson, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 9. involved particularly Sections 15, 16 and 23, Chapter 101,
'35 C.S.A., now 86-3-1, 2, 9, '53 C.R.S.
The Company had furnished materials to Thompson the principal contractor. The owner had failed to comply with the statute,
in not having a written contract recorded, which made the position
of the Company that of a principal contractor. The Court held under these circumstances that since a principal contractor has three
months under the statute in which to file lien claims, the filing of
such a claim after the expiration of the two months' period ordinarily allowed to subcontractors and before the expiration of the
three months period allowed to principal contractors is sufficient.
The Court further held it was not necessary that the materialmen
contract personally with the owner for the furnishing of materials
in order to have more than the two months within which to file;
that privity of contract between owners of the property and materialmen is created by the statute wherein the contractor is made
the agent of the owner and obviates the necessity of the materialmen contacting the owner in any matter whatsoever and the fact
of the selling of the material to the contractor and charging same
to his account does not operate as an estoppel to claim a lien under
the mechanic's lien statute. The Court followed Western Roofing
Company v. Fisher, 85 Colo. 5, 273 Pac. 19, wherein the rule was
laid down that where the contract was not filed of record, the lien
claim status of the subcontractor changed with respect to the time
for filing a lien so that it becomes a principal contractor and is
given three months from the completion of the work within which
to file the lien statement.
(7) OPTION TO PURCHASE-TIMELY TENDER
The case of Abrahamson v. Wilson, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 11, was an action for decree of specific performance upon an
option for the purchase of real estate for $9,000 of which $6,500
was to be paid when the option was exercised and the balance within one year. The option, dated April 11, 1953, provided that it
was understood that the buyer was attempting to have the property rezoned for business purposes and in view of this, the time
of the option should be twenty days from the time said property
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was rezoned or within ninety days from date, whichever was
shorter. That sellers were to tender abstract of title showing clear
title in themselves upon demand of the buyer, after the property
had been rezoned or if it was not so rezoned and the option was
exercised, then upon ten days notice from buyer; the contract
further providing that after the buyer gave notice of intention
to exercise the option, sellers would tender good and sufficient
warranty deed and the abstract of title and give buyer a reasonable
time to examine same. On May 4th the Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution, the purpose of which was to rezone
the property in question. On May 26th the purchaser called the
seller on the phone and was informed by the seller that the option
had expired. On May 27th the purchaser made a tender of $6.500
in cash and made formal demand for performance which tender
was refused. The Court pointed out that more than twenty days
had elapsed before the tender of the cash and demand for deed,
but found that the evidence in the case, without dispute, established that plaintiff gave notice of intention to exercise the option,
prior to the date on which the zoning resolution was adopted by
the Board of Commissioners and indicated that grave doubt existed
whether any real issue was taken with the testimony of purchaser
and another witness that demand for an abstract was made on the
sellers within the twenty day period of time. The opinion states
it would be unreasonable for the Court to construe the instrument
to mean that the purchaser should pay the sum of $6,500 to the
sellers before an opportunity had been afforded to examine the
abstract of title to the property involved. A decree of specified
performance was directed.

(8) TAx DEED-"HEREAFTER"
The case of Wigton v. Bedinger, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No.
10, was an action brought by the holder of a tax deed to quiet title.
The defendants claimed that there was no compliance with the
mandate of C.R.S. '53, 137-10-28 in that the notice of the County
Tieasurer did not provide for a time limit of more than five
months or at least three months before the time of issuance of the
treasurers deed. The tax deed and notice were in the record and
disclosed that the property was sold for general taxes of 1931 on
December 12, 1932, and that the property was assessed for that
year at a sum less than $100. Notice of application for the tax
deed was issued by the County Treasurer on October 19, 1953,
reciting tax deed would be issued December 30, 1953, "unless the
same has been redeemed prior to the issuance of said tax deed."
The Court determined that prior to an amendment, being
Chapter 227, S. L. 1937, p. 1053, there was no statutory requirement for notice, except in cases where the property was assessed
for more than $100 and that instant deeds or deeds without notice
were issued at any time after the expiration of three years from
the date of sale for taxes, in accordance with provisions of C.R.S.
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'53, 137-10-20; further that prior to the 1953 revision of the Colorado Statutes, Sec. 255 of said Chapter 227 of the 1937 Session
Laws contained the word "hereafter" providing among other things
that before any purchaser of land hereafter sold for taxes receives
a tax deed, the County Treasurer shall send notice to parties in
interest, not more than five months and at least three months before the time of issuance of the tax deed. The Court points out
that in the 1953 revision the word "hereafter" was omitted, but
in any event the revision was not in effect on the date application
was made by plaintiff for a deed and the land was sold for 1931
taxes and tax certificate issued in 1932, prior to the 1937 amendment now part of 137-10-28.
The Court said that it was obvious that its decision must be
that the property was sold for taxes prior to 1937 amendment of
137-10-28; that the records showed that the assessed valuation was
less than $100 and that no notice was required to be given prior
to the issuance of the tax deed.

TORTS
By RICHARD D. HALL of the Denver Bar

Many interesting and significant decisions in the field of
torts have been handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court during the past year. The most important of these cases, in my opinion, are the following:
(1)

IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE

In Moore v. Skiles, 130 Colo ...... 274 P. 2d 311, the plaintiff,
a passenger in a truck owned jointly by her and her husband, was
injured when the husband drove the truck into a collision with
the defendant's car. The plaintiff, Mrs. Moore, and her husband
were returning home after an evening with friends.
The trial court, over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, instructed the jury that if it found "that the accident would not have
occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers, then the
plaintiff can not recover for the damages which she claims to have
suffered . . ." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the appeal followed. The Colorado Supreme Court, after
noting the general rule that the negligence of a driver is not to be
imputed to a passenger in the car, Colorado and Southern Railway
Company v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 P. 801; Parker v. Ullom, 84
Colo. 433, 271 P. 187; Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Company,
53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, then proceeded to hold that the case at
bar fell within a well recognized exception. Thus, where the passenger by reason of joint ownership of the vehicle was in a position to exercise control over the driver, and was physically present
in the automobile, which was being used for a common purpose,
the negligence of the driver, if any, was imputed to the joint owner
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riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court approved the above instruction and affirmed the judgment.

(2) DoG BITE LIABILITY
Traditionally, liability for injuries inflicted by a dog required
proof of prior knowledge by the owner of the dog's vicious propensities, and in most cases proof was required of at least one prior
incident involving injury to some other person. However, in
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo .....- ,276 P. 2d 744, the Court affirmed
a judgment for $4,773.00 against the owner of a dog which attacked
and severely injured a Mrs. Jimerson, but was not proved to have
bitten any other person. The Court repeated the general rule that
the owner must have had notice before such accident of the vicious
propensities of his dog, but held that proof as to its vicious appearance and barking and constant confinement behind a fence was
sufficient proof as to knowledge by the owner of such fact. Upon
proof of such knowledge, the owner was held to keep the dog at
his own peril.
(3) RES IPSA LOQUITUR
In LaRoco v. Fernandez, 130 Colo .-... , 277 P. 2d 232, the
deceased, while driving his car behind the automobile of the one
defendant, Fernandez, was killed when the Fernandez car sideswiped the oncoming car of the second defendant, Lannan, which
then struck the deceased's car. In their answers each defendant
denied being negligent himself, but admitted that the other defendant was negligent. In their opening statements, counsel for each
defendant stated that their evidence would show that the other
defendant was over the center line and therefore negligent.
The plaintiff's evidence failed to indicate which of the two
defendants was across the center line at the time of the first impact, and accordingly the trial court granted the motion of each
defendant for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's case. The
Supreme Court stated that "in a proper case a judgment may be
entered for or against a plaintiff as a result of admissions by counsel in the opening statement," and noted that the same was true
as to pleadings. The Court then concluded that under the pleadings and opening statements a jury question was presented without specifically discussing the point that in this case the "admissions" in question were not true admissions against the interests
of the defendants making them, but were more in the nature of
allegations by each defendant against the other defendant who
had an adverse interest. The Court also, at the conclusion of the
decision, stated that "the circumstances as to the accident speak
for themselves, and therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable." This appears to be the first application in Colorado
of such rule to a case where control of the circumstances surrounding the accident was not wholly within the power of the defendant
against whom the rule was asserted. We may expect to see this
case cited frequently in future litigation where the plaintiff is
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obviously an innocent party but there is substantial doubt as to
which of several defendants is responsible.
(4)

TORT LIABILITY OF ASSOCIATION MEMBERS

In Thomas v. Dunne, 130 Colo ... ,279 P. 2d 427, the Supreme
Court considered a judgment which had been entered in favor of
a plaintiff who had been injured during a meeting of the Al Kaly
Temple, an unincorporated association with 1,753 members at the
time of the trial. Upon a jury verdict, judgment had been entered
by the trial court against the association and also against eleven
individual members of the association, none of which individuals
were proven to have taken an active part in the events which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that
the individual defendants were named as representatives of the
class consisting of the entire membership, and held that the provision in the old Code of Civil Procedure which limited such a
judgment to one against the joint property of the association itself
was still in effect. Thus, the judgment against the Al Kaly Temple
was affirmed and the judgments against the individual defendant
members were reversed.
(5)

UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT

In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Shupe, 131 Colo .... .,
280 P. 2d 1115, plaintiff's truck stalled on a railroad crossing about
dusk, where it was struck by defendant's train. There was conflicting testimony as to visibility and as to the opportunity to see
the lighted fuse set by the plaintiff.
On appeal a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a jury verdict was reversed for failure of the trial court to give an instruction on "unavoidable accident" tendered to the Court by counsel
for the defendant. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence
raised such an issue, and in answer to the assertion that such defense was not pleaded and therefore could not be injected into the
case at the time the instructions were being prepared, stated,
"while it is the usual practice to plead unavoidable accident as an
affirmative defense, the fact still remains that unavoidable accident
is but a denial of negligence, and in this case where the pleadings
disclosed that there were mutual denials of negligence, the issue
is in the case."
(6) LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The doctrine of last clear chance as developed by a large number of decisions of our Supreme Court, has been a doctrine normally
pleaded by the plaintiff in reply to the defense of contributory
negligence as alleged by the defendant in his answer. in the case
of Rein v. Jarvis, 131 Colo ......
281 P. 2d 1019, the DEFENDANT in
his answer alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision which was the basis of the
suit. Judgment was entered by the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff upon a jury verdict and defendant cited as error the re-
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fusal of the trial court to give an instruction tendered by the defendant as to the doctrine of last clear chance as alleged in his
answer.
The Court stated in its opinion that last clear chance was a
doctrine available to a plaintiff when such plaintiff is met with a
defense of contributory negligence. The Court then went on to
state that if the doctrine could be invoked by defendant, it would
be a confusing method of charging plaintiff with contributory
negligence. In other words, before the occasion could arise where
the doctrine could be invoked, the plaintiff already would be barred
by his contributory negligence. The judgment in favor of the
plaintiff was affirmed.
(7)

FALSE ARREST

The case of Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo ...... 283 P. 2d 177, is interesting in holding that where an invalid summons was served
upon the plaintiff for alleged violation of the Game and Fish Law,
and the plaintiff in accordance with such summons appeared in
Justice Court, there was no false arrest giving rise to a tort cause
of action. The Court in its opinion made clear that there must be
an intention to take a person into custody before there can be a
false arrest, and that a notification or command to a person to appear at a later date before a magistrate does not put such a person
under arrest any more than a witness is under arrest when served
with a subpoena. The judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed
on the above and other grounds.
(8)

PROOF OF NOTICE OF UNSAFE CONDITION OF FLOOR

The case of F. W. Woolworth Company v. Peet, 131 Colo.....
284 P. 2d 659, involved a claim by the plaintiff for injuries received
from a fall in the defendant's store resulting from her slipping on
some excrement in an aisle. There was no evidence introduced as
to when or how the substance got onto the floor. Under this state
of the evidence, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on a jury verdict, stating that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had proven no negligence on the part of the defendant
store as there was no evidence that the substance had been on the
floor for an unreasonable period of time. This case was not new as
to this doctrine, but strengthens the law on this point as found in
the prior cases of Atkinson v. Ives, 127 Colo. 243, 255 P. 2d 749,
and Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P. 2d 257.
(9) DEFINITION OF GUEST UNDER GUEST ACT

In Hoilenbach v. Fairbanks, 132. Colo ..... , 287 P. 2d 53, the
Court had before it the issue as to whether the deceased wife of the
plaintiff was a guest at the time of the fatal aucident. The deceased
at such time was riding with the defendant's wife, who was on
her way to town to get an angle iron for use by the plaintiff on
his truck, and for which he had agreed to later reimburse the defendant. After reviewing the rather involved fact situation, the
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Supreme Court held that the deceased was a guest within the
meaning of the Guest Act as there was no proof that the benefit
conferred upon the defendant was sufficiently real, tangible, and
substantial as to serve as an inducing cause for the transportation.
The Court in this case followed such doctrine as originally enunciated in Klatka v. Barker, 124 Colo. 588, 239 P. 2d 607.
(10

NECESSITY OF ELECTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES

Although the case of American Furniture Company v. Veazie,
131 Colo .....- ,281 P. 2d 803, might also be considered as within the
field of sales, such decision established an important rule of law
on an issue frequently arising under the law of torts. In this case,
a gas kitchen range, sold by the defendant store to the plaintiff and
later checked on two occasions by the defendant's service man,
exploded approximately four months after its sale with resulting
injury to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in her complaint alleged a claim for relief based
on breach of an implied warranty of fitness, and also claim for
relief based upon negligence. The trial court submitted both claims
to the jury under three forms of verdict, the jury returning a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on both of the claims despite the
instruction to return but one form of Verdict. The Supreme Court
in reversing the judgment in favor of the plaintiff held that there
was no implied warranty in this case because the stove was sold
under its trade name, and also held that there was no evidence
before the court of any negligence on the part of the defendant
store which was a proximate cause of the explosion. Of more
general interest was the statement of the Supreme Court that the
trial court should have required the plaintiff to elect which of the
two causes of action would be submitted to the jury, as it was
apparent that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on both
theories for one injury.

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
Please mail all checks to Mr. Ronald Russell, University of
Denver College of Law, with the checks made to the University
of Denver.
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Thank you,
RAYMOND J.
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FAMI LY LAW
By STEVENS PARK KINNEY of the Colorado Bar

Ten cases on the subject of Family Law have been decided
by the Supreme Court of Colorado since September 1954.
Notable among these are decisions involving the Reciprocal
Support Act and the question of the creation by the lower court
of trusts for the payment of alimony and support orders. Four
of the decisions of the trial courts were affirmed and six reversed
in part or toto; giving the lower courts less than a five hundred
percent batting average.
(1) In the case of Mable Graham v. Robert K. Graham, 195455 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, the question presented was whether or
not the Plaintiff had contracted a good and valid common-law marriage so that her divorced husband would be relieved from paying
alimony under an order for such entered by a Wyoming court.
This order specifically provided that alimony payments would cease
upon the remarriage of the wife.
The evidence showed that the Plaintiff assumed and'went by
the name of the second alleged husband; that she had lived with
him in an apartment house for at least four months, and represented herself to the neighbors as his wife. This evidence, the
Court held, was sufficient to show a good common-law marriage
had been contracted by the plaintiff and the second husband, thereby relieving the defendant of further alimony payments.
This case holds with the former rulings of the Colorado Court
on common-law marriage: that actual cohabitation coupled with
representations of marital status are sufficient to show intent and
contract necessary to establish the marriage relationship.
(2) Frank Granatov. Hazel Granato, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 3, Rehearing in Adv. Sh. No. 4, presented the question whether
a property settlement award made by the lower Court should stand.
The trial court awarded real estate valued at $10,000.00 subject to a deed of trust of more than $8,000.00, and personal property
of some $500.00 to the wife. No alimony award was made and the
question of support was held in abeyance. The husband objected
to the award on the grounds that such constituted all the property
that the parties owned. The husband also claimed that the holder
of the deed of trust should be included as an interested party in the
proceedings.
Based on the testimony, the Supreme Court denied the claims
of the husband. It held that property divisions are based on the
merits of each case and the trial court may use its discretion in
such orders. Unless the court abuses its discretion no error results. While the equity in the house, and other personal property
may have constituted all their common property, the husband could
not complain in this instance. The Supreme Court was no doubt
influenced by the fact that the total property award in lieu of
alimony was less than $2,500.00.
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And further, although the holder of the deed of trust appeared
and testified to the effect that if the wife received the property he
would cut the monthly payments on the loan; he was not a party
to the action, and any change in the loan contract was strictly a
matter between him and the owner of the property. The holder
of the loan was an uncle of the wife, not even a prospective suito.
The holding in this case is in keeping with past decisions that
property settlements are within the right of the trial court to determine, and if they are kept within the bounds of the court's discretion and jurisdiction they will be upheld.
(3) In Potter v. Potter, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6, a
type of case that will become more numerous in the future arises.
For the issue here comes under the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act which Colorado and nearly every other state has now
adopted in some form.
Herein a mother residing in California sued the father residing in Colorado for monthly support of a minor child. The
County of Los Angeles joined in asking for $1,549.59 as its past
contribution for the support of the minor.
The father offered in his defense, a divorce decree from the
state of Texas which set forth orders for the payment of support
for the minor children of the parties. At the hearing the father
testified as to his earnings, and after an order was entered directing
him to pay $50.00 per month support, and to reimburse the County
for its contribution, appealed to the Supreme Court. His grounds:
that the mother had failed to prove a cause of action, and the lower
court had failed to give full faith and credit to the Texas decree.
The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the lower court,
holding that the testimony of the father was sufficient to base the
awards as made thereon; that the Texas decree was not properly
offered, and even if it had been, that it was not a final order and
therefore not subject to the full faith and credit provisions of the
Colorado Constitution.
(4) In the Matter of Florence Pettington Wright v. The People in the Interest of Martha Victoria Rowe, Dependent, et al.,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6, the validity of a dependency adjudication was the issue.
This case is best stated in the words of the Court:
Herein a petition in dependency was filed in the
County Court of Clear Creek County by Florence Vorenberg, Director of the Clear Creek County Department of
Public Welfare, by which it was sought to have Martha
Victoria Rowe and Margaret Elizabeth Rowe adjudged to
be dependents. Florence P. Wright was named as respondent in the Petition; citation was served on her in
Larimer County, and her answer to the Petition was filed.
Upon trial it was adjudged that the children were dependent and neglected children, and that they be placed under
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the custody and care of the Clear Creek County Department of Public Welfare, for adoption.
Further facts were that under a divorce decree of the Larimer
County Court, the father had been awarded the custody of the
aforementioned children and the mother was granted visitation
rights. The father had brought the children to the Clear Creek
County Court and had signed a relinquishment of his rights.
Prior thereto, the father had moved about with the children
and the mother claimed their whereabouts was unknown to her
from 1950 until August of 1954 when a welfare worker came to
see her to get her to sign a consent for the adoption of the children.
The Petition in Dependency was filed in the Clear Creek
County Court on the 17th of August, the mother was served on
the 19th of that month, and trial was set for the 20th. Prior to the
trial date the mother filed a motion with the Larimer County Court
asking for the custody of the children.
In its opinion the Supreme Court deals at length with the testimony of the dependency hearing. The mother, her husband, and
two neighbor friends testified that the mother was a fit and proper
person to have the children.
Then the trial court allowed the People, over objections, to
enter its records, to have portions read therefrom, and took these
into consideration in its delibe-ations. Further hearsay testimony
was admitted, and an admission was made that the mother was not
contacted at the time of the relinquishment because the father did
not wish that she be.
To cap the climax, a "Confidential Report" on the mother made
up by the Welfare Department of Larimer County and marked
"Confidential" was produced, portions of it testified to by the wel'fare worker of Clear Creek County, who admitted she did not
make it up, but the report itself was exempted from being introduced because the court ruled it was confidential-all over the
objections of counsel for the mother.
Further hearsay evidence as to the findings of a psychologist
at the University of Colorado was offered and received. But why
go on. The trial court admitted reams of hearsay, all over objection.
The Supreme Court set aside the dependency findings, citing
the case of Bailey v. Bullock, 110 Colorado 205, which held that
"hearings in the Juvenile Court are under and bound by the rules
of evidence as in any other Court;" and if these rules are not followed error results.
In checking over the evidence submitted, the Supreme Court
found that no competent evidence had been offered to show that
the mother was unfit, and until such evidence is offered, she had
the right to the custody of the children. The Court cited Everett
v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34. The custody of the children was given to
the mother.
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(5) In the case of Storey v. Shumaker, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv.
Sh. No. 7, the question of two dependency and one adoption proceeding came up for review.
On January 19th, 1951, a petition in dependency relative to
Pamela Ann Storey was filed by John C. Shumaker in the Jefferson
County Court. On August 20th, 1951 without notice to the mother,
the Court found the child dependent and custody was granted to
Mr. and Mrs. John Shumaker.
On August 21st, 1952, the Shumakers filed a Petition in adoption for the child alleging that the Court had granted them care
and custody.
On September 30th, 1952, the mother filed a motion to vacate
the order of dependency and to stay proceedings in the adoption
matter. On this date a second dependency petition was filed by the
Shumakers, service thereon was had on the mother and upon hearing, the child was again found dependent and custody awarded to
the Shumakers.
On March 25th, 1953 an interlocutory decree of adoption was
granted to the Shumakers based on their original petition filed
August 21st, 1951. No written consent of the mother was obtained
and no notice was served on her.
The mother filed objections to the adoption decree on the
grounds that the Court did not have jurisdiction to enter such as
she had given no consent nor had she been served with any notice.
The Shumakers' stand was that the mother's right was divested by
the dependency hearings.
The question therefore was: Did the filing of the second Petition in Dependency and the order issued thereunder obviate the
necessity of obtaining the mother's consent, or the serving of the
notice on her as to the time and place of the adoption proceeding?
The Supreme Court held it did not, for at the time the adoption
petition was filed, no valid order of dependency was in effect, and
until such time, the rights of the mother were clearly defined in
Chapter 106, S.L. Colo. 1949. Until the provisions therein were
fully complied with, no valid adoption decree could enter. The trial
court was instructed to vacate the adoption decree.
(6) In Arzelia Bilorusky v. Alexander Bilorusky, 1954-55
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8, the point in review concerned the admission
of a letter in evidence. The wife had filed for separate maintenance, and the husband cross-filed for divorce. On trial the jury
found for the husband, and the divorce was granted.
At the trial the wife produced a letter allegedly written by her
husband to another woman, the contents of which showed that he
had been meeting her and wished to continue the relationship, and
also professed his love for her.
The wife stated that she was familiar with the writing of her
husband, but upon objection, the court ruled the letter could not be
introduced. In his testimony, the husband admitted writing the
letter, but still the court refused to admit it.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the letter had been properly
identified and it should have been admitted. A new trial ordered.
As dicta, the point was not in issue, the Court held that an
instruction given in the case was erroneous, to wit: "The Court instructs the jury that the obligation of the husband to support the
wife and the minor child of the parties is the same whether the
wife obtains a decree of separate maintenance or the husband obtains a decree of divorce."
(7) In Norah M. Walker, Administratrix of the Estate of
D elphy Walker, deceased v. Otto Walker, Otes Walker, et al.,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, the issue concerned a property
settlement made between the wife and husband during their marriage.
Delphy Walker and Norah were man and wife. At his death
the widow was appointed administratrix and claimed his property.
The other heirs contended that she and her husband had entered
into a property settlement in November of 1948, and that under
such agreement she had received certain property and had waived
any right or claim to further demands from the husband including
the right of inheritance.
Norah Walker contended that the terms of the agreement
were unfair and had not been explained to her. At the trial the
testimony of the wife failed to impress the Court, and she presented much that was barred by the "dead-man statute."
The testimony for the other heirs including that of Attorney
Hatfield of the Durango Bar, did impress the Court, and the property settlement was held good and valid.
The Supreme Court concurred, citing Hughes v. Leonard, 66
Colo. 500, and Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494 as supporting their
decision.
Principal: A property settlement may be made between husband and wife during the marriage, cutting off the wife's right of
inheritance, and this will be upheld. However, the Court did not
rule out the possibility that such might be set aside if not found to
comply with the rules of equity.
(8) In Fletcher M. Brown v. Katherine J. Brown, 1954-55
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, the court in its orders under a property
settlement set up a trust.
This ruling provided that the husband turn over to the wife,
the income from a trust, which amounted to $8,550.00 per year.
She was to hold this as trustee, for the support of minor children
of the parties. The funds were to support them, and if this income
provided a surplus, such should be kept for future years. The
husband was enjoined from pledging, mortgaging, selling or disposing of this trust property.
The question presented on review was: Did the lower court
have the authority to set up such a trust for the children?
The Supreme Court held it did not. Such a trust could not be
set up without the consent of the parties. The Court indicated that
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if the one in whose favor the trust was created objected, that such
objections would not be sustained. But in this case, the one against
whom the trust operated complained, and that such objections were
good, and the trial court had exceeded its authority.
Principal: In a property settlement, the trial court cannot
create a trust unless by consent of the parties, or unless agreed to,
or accepted by, the one against whom the trust is created. The
party in whose favor the trust is created cannot object.
(9) In Raymond F. Elmer v. Mildred L. Elmer, 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 12, the question of the validity of a trust order under
a property settlement is raised.
In this case the husband was ordered to pay permanent alimony of $350.00 per month, and that this should take the form of an
annuity trust, with a substantial insurance company, which shall
guarantee the wife an income of $350.00 monthly for the rest of
her life, and further provide that if the wife should die before 20
years, any unpaid balance would go to the children. The husband
had 30 days to set up this trust.
It was shown that it would take a sum in excess of $90,000.00
to creat such a trust.
The Supreme Court found no precedent for such an order.
In consistency with its ruling in the case of Brown v. Brown, supra,
the Court found such a trust not only beyond the jurisdiction of
the court to order, but from the evidence out of the financial means
of the husband to provide. The trust order was set aside with
directions to set a fair and reasonabie amount of alimony for the
wife.
Principal: Alimony payments cannot be set up or guaranteed
by the creation of an insurance trust.
(10) A matter of child custody is involved in Mary Jane Bird
v. Earl Allen Bird, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
In the original divorce decree in 1947 the mother was granted
the custody of three children. In 1954 the father obtained a modification of this order, he to have two children, the mother one.
From this change, the Supreme Court is petitioned for review.
After a complete review of the testimony, which was taken
at length over a period of time by the lower court, the Supreme
Court found nothing derogatory concerning the care and custody
of the mother, and also fearful of the bad effect of separating the
children, found no grounds for the modification of the custodial
order. Therefore it was set aside and the original order restored.
Principal: Modification of a custodial order should only be
made within the sound discretion of the court. If this is abused the
change will be set aside.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By FREDERICK P. CRANSTON of the Denver Bar
GENERAL STATEMENT

The consistent pattern followed in this field applies well established rules to specific fact situations and emphasizes the importance of proper interpretation of constitutional and statutory
language. Having determined upon the proper interpretation, those
charged with administrative duties thereunder and those affected
thereby must not deviate therefrom with respect to the matters
giving rise to the remedy sought or resisted nor with respect to
the method of pursuit of or defense against such remedy.
The cases will be discussed with relationship to the principles
announced rather than in chronological order.
I.
An administrative agency must act within the scope of the
authority conferred by the power creating it. Two cases fall within
this rule.
In Union Pacific Railroad Company et al. v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission et al.,' the parties other than the Commission
operated all except five of the wells producing both oil and gas in
the Rangely Field. The legislature had invested the Commission
with authority to enforce a statute forbidding waste of oil or gas,
the production of gas in an excessive or unreasonable amount from
wells producing both oil and gas, and the production of oil or gas
in such quantities or in such manner as would unreasonably reduce
reservoir pressure or unreasonably diminish the quantity of oil or

gas that might ultimately be produced. The Commission was vested
with authority to make and enforce such rules and regulations as
might be reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of the
act. Pursuant thereto, it made a regulation requiring all gas not
needed for lease operations or used locally for domestic or municipal needs to be returned to the reservoir. Plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the enforcement of this regulation. The court held that
the authority delegated to the Commission to prevent the production of gas in an excessive or unreasonable amount or in such manner as would not unreasonably reduce reservoir pressure did not
embrace the authority to make a regulation requiring excess gas
to be returned to the reservoir. The court recognized the advantages which might accrue from such a regulation, but nevertheless
enjoining its enforcement applying the well-established principle
that "the Commission may act only within the authority delegated
by the legislature under standards clearly fixed by the law, leaving no discretion in the Commission to declare what the law is."
As a result of this decision, the 1956 legislature will probably
'284 P. 2d 242.
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be given the ,opportunity to grant or to refuse to grant to the Commission the power to make such a regulation.
Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. Racing Commission,2 was another
case where a commission was held to have exceeded the power
delegated to it by the legislature. The racing act provided that
this Commission should license, regulate and supervise races and
pari mutuel wagering at which animals participated, should visit
and inspect such places at least once a year, and should require
such places to be constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with the laws of the state and the regulations of the Commission. The act provided certain limitations relative to the issuance
of licenses, the number of certain types of meets to be held in
any one county each year, the duration thereof, the distance of competitive tracks from each other, and that no race meets should be
conducted on Sunday. The statute also enumerated the eligibility
requirements and factors which would make applicants ineligible.
None of the restrictions rendered the plaintiff nor the locality ineligible. The Commission denied the plaintiff's application for a
license on the ground that there were already three tracks, including one forty-five miles distant from the proposed site, and because
180 days of racing had been permitted on the Eastern Slope and
the Commission felt the grant of the license would not be in the
best interest of racing nor of the state. The Supreme Court held
that the license should have been issued; that the Commission assumed powers and exercised discretion beyond the limitations described in the act; that the statute did not vest in the Commission
the authority to declare public policy, public policy having been
established by the vote of the people implemented by an act of the
legislature. It was not for the Commission to say what may or may
not be the need of certain localities nor what is in the best interest
of racing. While recognizing the duty to give full respect to the
findings of the Commission, such respect is to be accorded only if
the discretion is exercised on matters which the administrative
agency could lawfully consider. The power, granted by the statute
to prepare and promulgate a complete set of rules and regulations
to govern the race meets in the state and to determine and announce the place, time and duration thereof, is not a sufficient grant
of discretion so as to permit a limitation of the number of licenses
for reasons other than those specified in the statute. This construction is fortified by the provision that the Commission is commanded
to renew an application if no violation has been committed by the
operator, indicating the legislative policy of withholding authority
from this Commission in contrast to the broad authority granted
to the licensing authorities by the liquor code and the boxing and
wrestling act in each of which discretion was given to the respective adminstrative agency to limit the number of licenses. The
fact that the legislature could easily have given such power in the
2

277 P. 2d 226.
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manner followed by previous legislatures indicates that the legislature did not intend to give this Commission such broad powers.
The Commission's statement that the refusal was in the best interest of racing violates elementary principles of constitutional
law to the effect that the propriety, necessity and expedience of
legislation is for legislative determination only. The court was
unwilling to ascertain public policy from any source other than the
constitution and statutes. The Commission by its denial of a
license attempted to exercise a power which it did not possess.
Justice Alter concurred in the result. Justice Moore in behalf of himself, Chief Justice Stone and Justice Clark dissented
on the ground that racing is not inherently lawful but on the
contrary had been historically and inherently a gambling enterprise legalized only by virtues of the statute. The regulation of
this activity involve public morals and general welfare and thus
warranted an exercise of police power in the public interest. No applicant has an inherent right to engage in the business of racing and
wagering thereon. A license so to do is a privilege to be granted
or withheld in. the Commission's discretion. The statute granted
authority to license, determine the kind, time and place of racing
meets and consider the location of tracks; the statute limited the
power only in certain specific instances. The intent was to tell the
Commission when it cannot license, thus granting discretion in t~le
field outside the prohibited area. The Commission did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, and its ruling should not be
set aside in situations where reasonable minds might reach opposite conclusions. The court should not substitute its own judgment
for that of the administrative body.
II.
Although the action taken by an administrative agency is within
the scope of the power conferred, nevertheless in exercising discretion in carrying out its functions, it must adhere to the standards
prescribed by the authority creating it.
In Civil Service Commission v. Frazzini,3 the plaintiff asserted that the method employed by the Civil Service Commission
in conducting an examination for assistant fire chief and deputy
fire chief was improper, and, therefore, the appointment of the
successful applicant was improper. Under the procedure followed,
the oral examination was given a weight of 60, and merit and
seniority were each given a weight of 20. On the oral test and
individual interview test, there were eight factors considered upon
which each examiner gave each applicant a rating from A to E,
inclusive. The Denver charter required a competitive examination.
The court held with plaintiff in his contention that this method
precluded a competitive examination because it made objective
grading impossible and, accordingly, the grades given were depen' 287 P. 2d 433.
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dent entirely upon the impression made upon the individual interviewer rather than upon fixed standards which could accurately
and objectively determine the result. "By the very nature of a
subjective examination of this character, the likelihood of abuse,
favoritism and human error are inherent, and greatest care and
caution should be exercised by the Commission to avoid the possibility of these results . . . If personality factors are embraced
within the examination, the announcement should specifically so
state." In brief, the examination did not produce an objective
test; it was therefore not competitive. The Commission thereby
disregarded the standard prescribed. The court further held that
under the facts of this case, there was no estoppel because the candidate certified by the Commission will be returned to his former
position and, therefore, sustained no damage by reason of the
irregularities.
III.
If the administrative agency succeeds in avoiding the above pitfalls, has jurisdiction,regularly pursues its authority and does not
abuse its discretion, the courts will not review the merits of its
determination.
In Glenn v. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners.4 the
court comments that "the record in this case discloses a conglomerate mixture of procedural monstrosities." To avoid embarrassment, the court exonerated plaintiff's present counsel because such
counsel occupied "third place on the list of attorneys who have
represented him during the course of this litigation." The court
recognized the difficulties under which counsel operated and offered some slight encouragement by stating that they might have
done better had they represented the plaintiff throughout the proceedings.
The plaintiff who had been licensed to practice medicine was
charged with having uttered false narcotic prescriptions, being himself addicted to narcotic drugs for which he wrote prescriptions
for himself and others, all of which action allegedly constituted
grossly unprofessional and immoral conduct. The claim was that
the Commission in revoking his license to practice after a hearing
had made its determination upon insufficient evidence and as
a result of passion and prejudice.
In sustaining the Commission, the court stated that it had
many times announced that it was restricted on a review to a consideration of "wh-ether the Board had jurisdiction; abused its discretion; or regularly pursued its authority." It considered the
facts only to the extent of determining whether the Board wrongfully exercised its authority without proper or judicious discretion,
4 284

P. 2d 230.
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and having determined that it did not so act, held that the merits
of the case were not involved.
With respect to the charge of passion and prejudice, the court
stated:
The record clearly shows that said Board treated
plaintiff with every courtesy and give him every opportunity and any other finding would have been but a whitewash and the exercise of an unjustified leniency to the
detriment of the public welfare.
IV.
The sovereign and the citizen must properly pursue the remedy in
the manner and form prescribed by the authority creating the
remedy. The case of the aggrieved citizen will be first considered.
In Heron v. City and County of Denver,5 the court held that,
if an administrative agency makes a mistake, the way to correct
it is to exhaust the administrative remedy before commencing a
civil action. The Denver building code provided that only a licensed
architect may submit plans and specifications for public or semipublic buildings. The plaintiff being an engineer but not a Colorado
architect submitted plans and specifications, but a building permit
was denied. The building code provided that a person thus aggrieved should seek relief within a specified time from the Board
of Appeals created by the code. The plaintiff by-passed this procedure by the island-hopping tactics of commencing an action
in the District Court, defending his position by the contention that
the issuance of the building permit was a ministerial act and not
one which required the intermediate step of applying to the Board
of Appeals. The court, however, remained unconvinced, stating:
Unless the administrative remedies are exhausted,
it never can be known what correction would ensue if the
authority is given full opportunity to pass upon the matter. Our court has adhered rather strictly to the requirement of the exhaustion of administrative remedies before
the court will take jurisdiction.
The above rule is applicable where an arm of the state considers that the sovereign has been aggrieved.
In People ex rel Kimball, Director of Game and Fish Department v. Crystal River Corporation,6 it appeared that a bear had
caused the death of forty-four sheep. The owner of the sheep,
pursuant to the statute which gave him a right of action against
the sovereign, made claim, pursuant to which arbitrators were appointed as the statute directed. The Game and Fish Department
submitted evidence and named one of the arbitrators. The award
5 283 P. 2d 647.
a 280 P. 2d 429.
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was made and certified in favor of the claimant but was attacked
by the Commission. The court held that the sovereign having consented to this method of determining the liability is bound by the
action of the proper administrative agency; and the arbitrators
having jurisdiction, a writ of certiorari would not issue as a matter
of right, but only on good cause shown which would justify an
inference of fraud or abuse of discretion on the part of the arbitrators. Neither the individual nor the agency of the state may
participate in the selection of the arbitrators, attend the hearings,
submit evidence and, in the event of an adverse finding, seek a
review merely because the award is unfavorable.
V.
A statute of limitation does not bar a proceeding to recover from
the estate of a decedent funds of the sovereign paid by an administrative agency to the decedent which the decedent was not entitled to receive.
In State of Colorado v. Estate of Griffith,7 the decedent had
been an old age pension recipient. After her death, it appeared
that the extent of her property holdings rendered her ineligible
to have received any pension. Within the six months, Jefferson
County Welfare Department filed a claim to recover a portion of
the amount paid; after the six months it amended its claim to
recover the entire amount paid. The state filed its claim for the
same entire amount as a matter of security against the contingency
that the Welfare Department's claim might be disallowed. The
court held that time does not run against the sovereign. This principle can more forcibly be applied in the case of fraud than in other
cases. The claim of Jefferson County Department of Public Welfare as an arm of the state should have been allowed.
VI.
The recent inaugurationof a strict construction of tax exemptions
will be adhered to.
In Grace Calvary Church v. City and County of Denver,8 the
church had purchased land at a tax sale for the purpose of erecting
a building, but it was denied a building permit because it was on
the route of the proposed Valley Highway. The action was to recover taxes previously paid on the ground that the property was
exempt.
The statute exempts from taxation "lots with the buildings
thereon, if said buildings are used exclusively for religious worship." In former decisions, the court had held that where it was
contemplated that structures were to be used and steps were to be
taken to indicate such intention, the exemption would apply. In
one such decision, an excavation had been dug and a foundation
1275 P. 2d 945.
9 274 P. 2d 983.
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commenced, and in another case an existing building had been
demolished with the intention of erecting a new building in its
place. However, this liberality had been discarded by the court
in the case of City and County of Denver v. George Washington
Lodge Association," wherein Justice Stone stated:
It is not surprising in view of the former decisions
of this court that the trial court so held (in favor of the
exemption.) However, a departure is not less a departure
because it is made step by step, and it appears high time
for this court to determine not merely how far we have
departed from the last departure, but whether we have
departed from requirements of the statute itself.
In the case before the court, the application for a building
permit followed by its denial was not even the vestige of a structure, and in the absence of the structure, the requirement of the
statute was not met, and the exemption necessarily failed.
CONCLUSION
The above decisions indicate that administrative agencies and
persons dealing with them or affected by their actions can anticipate strict construction with respect particularly to the limitations
of authority, the abuse of discretion, exhausting the administrative
remedy, the finality of determinations by such agencies acting
properly within their authority, and a strict construction likewise
of any privilege of exemption or statutory limitation which would
impair the public revenue. The broad inference is that powers
conferred and privileges granted must be clearly contained in
legislative language and that failure to observe procedural requirements invites disaster.

I

Notes From The Secretary

The final report of the Economic Survey and Minimum Fees
Committee of The Colorado Bar Association is now being readied
for publication. At the present time our thought is that it will be
a part of the Annual Report, which will be mailed to the members
in late January or early February. The report is very extensive
and includes summaries and tables on both the Economic Survey
Questionnaires and the Minimum Fee Questionnaires. We are sure
that all of you will look forward to this report with great interest.
The Grievance Committee of The Denver Bar Association has
had numerous complaints filed with it during the past few months.
Most of these complaints referred to the method of charging fees
1121

Colo. 470, 217 P. 2d 617.

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1955

in divorce cases. It certainly would help our public relations,
instill confidence in the client, and result in less complaints to the
Association if the fees to be charged are definitely understood at
the time the client retains the attorney for representation. In
some situations this type of case does present numerous questions
concerning fees. A frank discussion of the problems involved with
the client at the very beginning and a consideration of the Canons
of Ethics included in these notes should alleviate this problem.
It cannot be overemphasized that the Editors of DICTA are
constantly looking for articles to be printed in DICTA. They would
also welcome any comments or suggestions you might have concerning the material included in each issue.
We are extremely elated with the response of the members to
the Social Security and Biographical questionnaires. If you have
not yet completed and mailed your questionnaires, do so at once.
Following the Canons of Ethics are the Committee reports of
The Denver Bar Association for the fiscal year 1954-55. We would
appreciate receiving any comments concerning the activities of
any of the committees and the recommendations they make.
I wish to take this opportunity, on behalf of the officers of both
The Denver and Colorado Bar Associations, to extend to you our
best wishes for a happy holiday season.
CANON 10. ACQUIRING INTEREST IN LITIGATION

The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
OPINION 29-To secure his fee, a lawyer may take a conveyance of
property which is the subject of litigation only if it is taken subject
to the rights of the adverse party.
OPINION 246-A lawyer may not buy stock in a corporation which is
a party to litigation in which he is engaged, or advise others to do so.
CANON 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
OPINION 125-A lawyer may not retain the money of one client to
force a settlement of the disputed claims of other clients.
CANON 12. FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE

In fixing. fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their advice and services, as well as those which undervalue
them. A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess
of the value of the service, though his poverty may require a less
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charge, or even none at all. The reasonable requests of brother
lawyers, and of their widows and orphans without ample means,
should receive special and kindly consideration.
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
cause; (2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular
case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely
to arise out of the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable
expectation that otherwise he would be employed, or will involve
the loss of other employment while employed in the particular case
or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of
the Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;
(5) the contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6)
the character of the employment, whether casual or for an established and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself
is controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining the real value
of the service.
In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar
services, it is proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole guide
in determining the amount of his fee.
In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession
is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere moneygetting trade.
OPINION 27-The amount of a fee presents no ethical question unless it is
flagrantly excessive. A lawyer may deduct his fees when remitting money
received for a client. Where joint services are rendered, the lawyer rendering a major portion of the services may deduct his fee before remitting
funds received.
OPINION 28-Fees should be determined according to the circumstances
of each case rather than by an obligatory schedule of a local bar.
OPINION 63-A lawyer is under no ethical obligation to his associates for
the payment of their fees for services rendered his client unless he has
agreed to be liable therefor.
OPINION 130-A lawyer who was not informed that his client had previously employed another lawyer may proceed with the case though he
learns at the time set for trial that the other lawyer had been employed;
and he is under no obligation to require the client to pay the other lawyer.
OPINION 171-It is improper for a lawyer, in fixing his fees, to permit
himself to be controlled by an obligatory minimum fee schedule.
OPINION 190-Fees should ordinarily be based on consideration of the
factors stated in Canon 12, but a lawyer may contract for any fee he chooses
so long as it is not excessive.
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OPINION 250-A lawyer should sue for a fee only when circumstances
imperatively demand it, especially where this involves the disclosure of
confidential communications.

CANON 13. CONTINGENT FEES

A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a Court, as to its reasonableness.
CANON

14. SUING A CLIENT FOR A FEE

Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his selfrespect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his
services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to
prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.
The following are most of the Denver Bar Committee reports
for the last fiscal year:
Auditing and Budget ---------------------Norma L. Comstock, Chairman
Following our organization meeting which was held September 23, 1954, each of the members, acting as a subcommittee, kept
in contact with the standing committees of the Denver Bar Association so as to obtain information as to their current and anticipated
expenditures, expanded activities and other pertinent data. Study
was also made of the records of income and expenses, both of the
Denver and Colorado Bar Associations, and the chairman sat in
on several meetings of the Budget Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association in the capacity of observer. Following the adoption
of the Colorado Bar Association budget, the Denver committee
held its final meeting and adopted a budget which was submitted
to the officers and Trustees of the Denver Bar Assaciation and
adopted in the form submitted at a meeting held for that purpose.
This is the first time that a budget for the Denver Bar Association has ever been presented by a committee appointed for that
purpose, and a considerable effort was expended to study the financial problems of the Association to the end that a realistic budget
be submitted. It is the committee's recommendation that some
method of keeping a current record of members be adopted so
that it will be known from day to day exactly what the membership of the Association is and also that some better methods of
keeping the receipts and disbursements on Dicta be adopted.
---------William E. Meyers, Chairman
Entertainment ----------------------The Entertainment Committee last year embarked upon an
enlargement of the scope of the entertainment for members of the
Bar. It is our feeling that the strength of the Association is based
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to a certain extent upon the membership thereof being socially
cohesive, and our further thought that each attorney's job can be
made less complicated by cooperation of other counsel based on
firm social relationships. It is our sincere thought that further
expansion of the entertainment is both advisable and necessary
in keeping with the definite present progressive attitude of the
Denver Bar Association.
Your committee re-initiated an annual dinner dance for the
membership this year. It is our opinion that the dinner dance was
highly successful. The records of the Association will reflect that
it cost the Association approximately $140, which deficit was anticipated because of the fact that this was the origination of what
we hope shall continue" to be an annual series of dinner dances.
It is my personal suggestion that at the dinner dance next year,
if such be held, the seating arrangements be handled differently
than this year. Tables of four should be set up which can be moved
together if necessary. As you know, this year the Cosmopolitan
Hotel set up only tables of twelve (contrary to the arrangements
we had made), with a result that certain late-comers in large
parties had to be separated because of lack of seating arrangements. It is my further suggestion in connection with next year's
dinner dance that a temporary committee be set up composed of
the President of the Denver Bar Association, one representative
from the Board of Trustees, the Executive Secretary of the Bar
Association and the past president of the Bar Association, which
committee would perform the following function: To designate
the member who, in their opinion, has contributed the most to the
welfare of the Association and the community of lawyers during
the past year; that the dinner dance be the time and place at which
said award (a plaque or otherwise, as determined by the committee) be given to the designated party. This would not only
add a great deal of dignity to the dinner dance itself, but would
be an inducement to the membership to become active in the affairs
of the Association as well as a reward for those members who
have devoted their time and energy untiringly.
Also initiated this year was a golf tournament in conjunction
with the stag party and picnic. We of the committee feel that the
tournament and picnic this year were highly successful. We feel
that the type of entertainment provided for the membership has
set a precedent which may be followed in the future without returning to the strip-tease type of stag show. Although I have not
polled the committee, it is my personal feeling that this type of
entertainment is much more in keeping with the dignity of the Bar
Association. There has been certain discussion about the expansion of this golf tournament for next year, starting the golf tournament sometime prior to the picnic and culminating it on the
date of the picnic. It would certainly be my suggestion that Ted
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Adams, Jack Longway and John Thompson be named again as
members of the Entertainment Committee to assist or take charge
of providing for next year's tournament. I make this suggestion
because of the excellent job which was done by them this year.
We feel that the ideas advanced for the picnic and golf tournament
this year should be retained and perfected for future years to develop an annual stag party and golf tournament for the attorneys
which will be an affair to be looked forward to by all members of
the Association.
It is our further suggestion that plans be made during the
next year, and put into effect if possible, for the commencement
of a lawyers bowling league. Details, of course, would have to be
worked out by the committee, but it is our thought that such a
league would be highly acceptable to the membership.
I think it is further worthy of note that the expanded entertainment program for the Denver Bar Association contemplates
participation in such a program by the attorneys and their wives.
For this reason, it is further suggested that the new committee
consider a proposal to the Board of Trustees for the initiation and
creation of a wives auxiliary to the Bar Association. Particularly
with reference to the annual dinner dance, this type of an organization would be of extreme value. We feel that in many functions
of this nature the wives perhaps control the decision to attend,
and the enthusiasm of the lawyers' wives for functions of this type
may have a direct bearing on their failure or success. It is further
felt that if a wives auxiliary existed, the entertainment program
of the Bar could be further expanded to include many activities
which might otherwise be unsuccessful on the basis of an appeal
to the lawyers only. It is my further feeling that the public relations of the Bar Association and the lawyers as a whole could
be served effectively by participation in one manner or another in
certain of the well established charitable causes; a progressive
Entertainment Committee with the support of a wives auxiliary
would certainly be in a position to accomplish a program of this
type, whereas the Entertainment Committee functioning alone
would probably not have the time to devote to such a far-reaching
program.
In conclusion, I wish to state that the committee has accomplished certain of the objectives which we had in mind at the beginning of the last fiscal year. Many of our other objectives remain as ideas only, all of which we hope have sufficient merit to
justify the consideration of the new committee.
Ethics and Grievances
(No report filed)

----------- Godfrey

ordmark, Chairman

Fellowship -----------------------------------------Floyd F. Walpole, Chairman
As Chairman of the Committee, I sent letters of sympathy on
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behalf of the officers and members of the Association to the bereaved families of members of our Association who have died
during the past administration, as follows:
Whitney T. Gould, Wm. G. Benton, Milton Keegan, Henry
McAllister, Robert G. Bosworth, Felix O'Neill, Lewis A. Dick,
Bruce B. McCay, John Coen, Paul Lee, Frank Wachob, James T.
Jacobs, George Evans and Carle Whitehead.
In addition flowers were sent to the funerals in some instances
although this practice has now been discontinued because instead
of sending flowers, the secretary of the Association makes a contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation in memory of the deceased lawyer and notifies the family to this effect. I consider this
a very worthwhile change in our procedure.
Letters were also sent to certain members of the Bar who
were ill at home or in hospitals.
Recently Everett Smith, Milnor Gleaves, Victoria Gross and
myself, all members of the Fellowship Committee, took in charge
District Judge Makasiar of the Philippine Islands, who was visiting Denver. We introduced him to Judge Knous of the Federal
Court, who had quite a talk with him. I took him in to the U. S.
District Court where the trial of certain alleged members of the
Communist Party was being held, etc., and Judge Makasiar was
very appreciative of our kindness in making these contacts for
him. Everett Smith also took him to the Supreme Court.
I feel that the work of the Fellowship Committee is very
worthwhile and rewarding. The touching and lovely letters received from the widows, children and other relatives of the deceased members of our Association is sufficient reward for the time
and energy consumed in sending out letters of sympathy, etc.
Years ago annual memorial services were held in the District
Court for deceased members of the Association. This practice
was abandoned some years ago and I feel that our present procedure is quite worthwhile and should be continued.
Institute -------------------------------------------------H . Harold Calkins, Chairm an
During the current year your Committee was active in the
following capacities in preparing a full Institute program for
members of the Denver Bar Association:
The committee was solely responsible for the presentation of
an Institute on February 19, 1955 on the problems of law relating
to Security Regulations.
The committee assisted in the preparation and presentation
of an Institute covering the New Internal Revenue Code in September, 1954, in cooperation with the Colorado Society of Certified
Public Accountants.
The committee assisted the Junior Bar Section of the Denver
Bar Association and of the Colorado Bar Association in the prepar-
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ation and presentation of an Institute on the legal problems of Oil
and Gas during the month of May, 1955.
The committee has had a number of requests and indication
among the members of the Bar Association for further institutes
covering the general problems of mineral law. The committee
feels that in view of the increased importance that uranium, oil
and gas, plays in the practicing lawyer's activity that further institutes dealing with this subject matter should be held.
There was considerable enthusiasm in the committee for an
institute dealing with the general problem of the law surrounding
the preparation of a plaintiff's personal injury case. This institute should include the function of a lawyer from the time of
injury through appeal, if any, of a trial decision.
Judiciary ---------................-------------------Peter H. Holme, Jr., Chairman
The following constitutes the report of the Judiciary Committee of The Denver Bar Association for the year now ending.
Perhaps the most unusual, and in many ways the most important, work done by the committee was done in response to the
request from Judge Breitenstein that The Denver Bar Association
provide a team of Denver lawyers which he could appoint to undertake the defense of the seven persons indicted for violations
of the Smith Act. So far as your committee knows, this is the
first time a request of this sort has been addressed by a Court to
the Bar Association. The reason for the request is, of course,
obvious because of the nature of Smith Act trials and the burden
which it imposes upon defense counsel. Your committee met many
times in the carrying out of this task. At the outset it was necessary to devise a plan which would have the result of spreading
the burden as equitably as possible under the circumstances. As
a result of these meetings, the conclusion was reached that the
twelve largest firms in Denver would each be asked to furnish the
name of a lawyer whose services would be available for the defense. Meetings were then held with representatives of these offices and with the exception of only one office which refused to
participate, the response was immediate and most gratifying. Despite the fact that all offices knew that the trial of this case would
be prolonged far beyond any ordinary lawsuit and that there was
involved not only the financial sacrifice of contributing for no
compensation a lawyer's services for a period of many months, each
of these eleven offices recognized its professional responsibility in
the. highest traditions of the Bar. The eleven names were submitted to Judge Breitenstein, who then appointed all of them to serve
on the defense team. The dedicated service which this team rendered is now a matter of public record and has earned for them
individually and for the Bar as a whole, public commendation and
great credit. In the opinion of your committee, the Bar Association owes to this group a lasting debt of gratitude.
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The second matter of importance undertaken by your committee was in connection with the proposed increase in salaries for
the Denver Courts. The underlying plan differed from former
proposals of this nature in that it would permit the salaries of
Denver judges paid by the State to be supplemented by additional
salaries paid out of City and County funds. The proposal was
also made that two additional district judgeships be created in
Denver. Your committee had several meetings on this question
and when the Legislature convened and throughout the session,
numerous calls were made upon the Legislature by the undersigned
and Robert Bugdanowitz and from time to time other members of
the committee, in the attempt to lobby these bills through. After
conferences with Judge Holland of the Supreme Court, it was
concluded that the request for additional judgeships be dropped
at this time in order that the new procedures being used in the
Denver Courts be given a longer test to establish whether or n6t
the present number of judges can handle the case load and keep
the dockets more current. The salary requests were pressed and
hearings were held before the committees of the House and Senate,
which had the bills under consideration. Unfortunately, we were
unable to persuade the Legislature that the bills be passed. Nevertheless, we believe the work done was not wasted because a number
of legislators who had not given much thought to the Denver problem as opposed to the judgeship problem elsewhere in the State,
are now thinking about it, and many of these, we believe, recognize
the need for additional compensation for Denver judges. The
largest single obstacle to the bills at this time, we believe, was the
fact that all of the Denver judges had so recently been re-elected
and many members of the Legislature felt that since the judges
had just finished running for the job knowing of the salary it
carried, they could not complain if their salaries were not raised
at this time. Your committee feels that despite its inability to
secure passage of this legislation in the 1955 assembly, continued
efforts should be made in each succeeding assembly until the salary scales are fully adequate.
The next item on your committee's agenda was to assist in
persuading Congress to create an additional Federal Judgeship
for the District of Colorado. Correspondence with Senators Millikin and Allott resulted in the introduction by them of a bill in the
Senate which bears No. S 1634, which, at latest advice, is now
pending in the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate.
Hearings were held on this in the latter part of May, and we have
not, as of this writing, been advised as to the outcome thereof.
The fourth item on the committee's agenda is a proposed
revision of the Rules of Procedure for the Denver County Court.
Mr. Baer of your committee has given this matter considerable
study, and conferences with County Judge Brofman are forth-
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coming in the near future. The County Court has now received
an appropriation to permit the printing of such rules, and it is
hoped that they can be issued by the end of the year.
The fifth matter which has just come to your committee's
attention is a proposed program of the Junior Bar Committee to
provide law clerks for the Denver judges out of the ranks of outstanding students in the University of Denver Law School, and,
to the extent possible, the University of Colorado Law School.
This project will be discussed with the Court and the deans of the
law schools, and if acceptable to them, will then be submitted to
the Junior Bar Committee and the Judiciary Committee for study
and recommendations.
As indicated in the foregoing, the Judiciary Committee recommends continuing work upon the following:
1. Improvement of salaries for Denver judges.
2. Further consideration, if circumstances warrant, of the
addition of more judgeships to the Denver District Court.
3. Further assistance in the promotion of an additional Federal District judgeship for Colorado.
4. Continued study and development of new County Court
rules.
5. Although this problem has not been up for formal discussion before the Judiciary Committee in the past year, it is at
least the personal recommendation of the chairman that efforts
be made in the forthcoming year to secure the restoration of regular pre-trial procedures in the Denver District Courts.
Junior Bar --------..............------------------Richard C. Cockrell, Chairman
The Junior Bar Committee of the Denver Bar Association has,
during the past fiscal year engaged in numerous activities which
have seemed peculiarly appropriate to it. Its functions during the
year began under the chairmanship of Luis D. Rovira, who was
obliged to resign from the committee because of his appointment
by the United States District Court to defend the alleged Communists being tried in that court. Despite this loss, the members
of the committee were able to carry out many of the plans which
Mr. Rovira had initiated.
Acting through James B. Reed, the Committee handled the
arrangements for one of the regular monthly luncheon meetings
of the Denver Bar Associaiton. Mr. Reed was able to obtain Mr.
Douglas McHendrie as principal speaker, and Mr. McHendrie
spoke on the Colorado Bar examination. His topic-was rendered
especially timely because of the then current attacks in the Denver
newspapers upon the examination. Newspaper reports of Mr.
McHendrie's remarks presented the Bar examination and its normal results in a more favorable and more accurate light.
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The committee considered the recommendation of one of its
members, C. Michael Morris, that an investigation be made of the
possibility of arranging for law students to serve as clerks to
judges of courts of record in Denver, and also the possibility of
increasing the number of such clerks now assisting the Supreme
Court of Colorado. The Committee was of the opinion that, because
of location, such clerks would need to be drawn from the enrollment
of the University of Denver College of Law. The committee also
realized that it would not likely prove possible for such clerks to
receive any remuneration, but considered that an adequate number
of students would be willing to undertake such work for the valuable experience which would be involved.
The Committee then asked one of its members, James B.
Reed, to contact the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for
the purpose of ascertaining that Committee's view of such a project. Mr. Reed has reported that the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee favors the idea and, accordingly, it is recommended that
the incoming Junior Bar Committee contact the Dean of the University of Denver College of law, the presiding judge of the Denver
District Court, the county and juvenile judges of Denver, and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to determine their reaction
to the proposal. If this should prove favorable, steps should be
undertaken to implement the program.
The Committee acted as joint sponsor, with the Junior Bar
Section of the Colorado Bar Association and the University of
Denver College of Law, of an institute on oil and gas law, held
during the month of May, 1955. Robert C. Hawley, a member of
the committee, acted as chairman of the joint institute committee,
and his activities resulted in the presentation of an exceptionally
successful institute. Attendance at sessions of the institute ran
very high, and the ability of the several speakers aroused much
favorable comment. Mr. Hawley is due thanks for his vigorous
and efficient approach.
Two members of the committee, Rendle Myer and Richard L.
Schrepferman, undertook the task of obtaining a new series of
articles on every-day legal questions, for publication in various
newspapers in Colorado. They contacted approximately 40 members
of the Junior Bar, requesting that each individual write a short
article on the subject indicated. As of this date, not all of the
requested material has been received, but Mr. Myer and Mr.
Schrepferman are presently following through in an effort to
complete the series of articles and will, when all have been received, deliver them to the Public Relations Committee for proper
distribution.
The Committee was asked, by Mr. Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.,
Chairman of the Public Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association, to obtain the names of two graduates from each
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public and Roman Catholic parochial high school in Denver who
would be willing to accompany the "Tribute to the American Lawyer" which was presented to the Denver Bar Association by the
United States National Bank of Denver. Such list was provided
through the efforts of Arthur Frazin and James B. Reed.
Mr. Frazin has also agreed that he will handle the Speakers
Bureau Program which has hitherto been under the direction of
the Honorable H. Joe Rawlinson, Jr. The matter has been discussed with Judge Rawlinson, and he has expressed his willingness
to assist Mr. Frazin in every way possible. It appearing to the
Junior Bar Committee that the only aspect of the Speakers Bureau
Program which exhibited any sign of organization was that which
Judge Rawlinson headed with relation to the Denver public high
schools, the Committee was of the opinion that this aspect should
not only be continued, but that a general speakers bureau be undertaken so that the Bar Association could respond speedily to any
requests from groups of laymen to have an attorney address them.
The Committee considered a recommendation of G. Michael
Morris that a list of all legal publications be compiled, and that
it be determined whether or not any of these might be made available to younger lawyers at reduced prices. The Committee had no
doubt about the desirability of obtaining reductions in prices, but
did tend to feel that compilation of such a list might not be humanly
possible, and also doubted that it would be entirely practical or
useful. Accordingly, it did not recommend that this activity be
continued.
Mr. Morris also recommended to the committee, in view of
the repeated criticisms of the Bar examination by the Denver
newspapers, that it investigate the subject generally to determine
whether or not it might make any recommendations concerning the
Colorado Bar examination. Another member of the committee,
Joe S. Reynolds, expressing interest in the question, volunteered
to initiate this study. As of the date of this report, Mr. Reynolds
has made no report of his findings, and he will be requested to
render it to the incoming members of the Junior Bar Committee.
Although at the beginning of the term, several members of
the Junior Bar Committee expressed the thought that perhaps
there-was no area of Bar Association activity which could reasonably be set apart to younger members of the Bar, once the Committee got down to work it found quite a number of fertile areas into
which it might be the logical vehicle for investigation. As indicated above, there are several fields in which the committee's
efforts have yet to be completed, and which the committee wishes
to recommend to the new committee for continuation and completion.
Legal Aid ------------------------------------------------ Mary C. Griffith, Chairman
(No report filed)
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Legal Service and Lawyer Reference Service ...................
M ilton J. Blake, Chairman
..........................-------------------------------The work of this Committee is principally concerned with
supervising the operation of the lawyer referral service of the
Denver Bar Association. The actual operation of this service has
been conducted by the Secretary, Donald S. Molen, and his assistants, during this year in a very effective and efficient manner.
The Committee considered several problems which arose during the year and consulted with the Secretary as to these problems and other matters of operation and administration. It also
gave consideration to making certain changes in the referral plan
and the rules for its conduct. These changes are still under study
and no recommendations in this regard are made at this time.
The referral service appears to be based on an adequate plan
and has been operating effectively. It is definitely providing a
much needed service to the public which could and should be increased by more publicity as to its availability. It is hoped that
more such publicity can be obtained in the future through the cooperation of social agencies, banks, trade and labor organizations
and other public contacts. Other increases in publicity would require additional funds in the budget of this committee.
The Secretary and the Chairman of the Committee have met
with and been in frequent communication with the Chairman of
the Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral Services of theAmerican Bar Association, so that the benefits of cooperation and
collaboration with each other were obtained. From these contacts it appears that the lawyer referral service of the Denver Bar
is operated much like the average of such services and in as good
if not better manner than most others.
It is recommended that the Committee and its activities be
continued.
Legislative ------------------............---------.---------------Ira L. Quiat, Chairman
Briefly, the Legislative Committee:
1. Reviewed the proposed zoning ordinances, caused certain
inequitable provisions to be changed and some amendments to be
adopted. Most of the Committee's recommendations concerning
the zoning ordinances were brushed aside by the Council and given
no consideration.
2. Drafted and caused to be passed, 20 new acts by the Legislature, all of which are of interest to the legal profession.
I prepared an article for Dicta concisely stating the essential
provisions of these new laws, which article has appeared in DICTA.
Meetings ........-------------------------------------(No report filed)

Charles C. Nicola, Chairman
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Membership --------------------------------------Francis S. Mancini, Chairman
(No report filed)
Minimum Fees.-------------------------------- Charles E. Grover, Chairman
The Committee as appointed was purposely increased in size
to ten members in order to get a broader base and variety of experience in regard to fees and office management. During the
course of this past year the new committee considered not only
the recommendations of the previous committee headed by Mr.
Yegge, but also considered various recent fee schedules of other
cities, such as Seattle, Washington; Akron, Ohio; Cincinnati, Ohio;
Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; and Los Angeles, California.
The activities of the current committee were culminated at its
meeting held on May 26, 1955, at which time agreement was reached
concerning a new revised fee schedule. This latter meeting was
the third of three formal meetings held by the committee, and in
addition thereto a considerable amount of work had been done
summarizing and reporting the results of other minimum fee
schedules for consideration by the members prior to such meetings.
The new fee schedule, as recommended by the current committee, made some rather marked changes from the previous form
of the Denver Bar Association minimum fee schedule in the following particulars: A new category was created in regard to the
preparation of legal instruments, title examination and consummation of real estate transactions, for which the minimum fee was
set at 1/2 of 1% of the gross purchase price, with a minimum of
$25.00. Also, a new category was set for an hourly rate minimum
(for general office work and consultation) at $15.00 per hour. In regard to estates, a new breakdown was made on estates in excess of
$250,000.00, and a new percentage basis was set up for charges in
connection with joint tenancy and other property involving federal estate and inheritance tax rates, but which did not necessarily
go through the County Court. A number of the other minimum
fees were raised or modified.
A subcommittee, consisting of Messrs. Rosenbaum, McKinlay
and Grover, met with the Public Relations Committee of the Denver Bar Association in order to fully inform them of the minimum
fee changes and to correlate information pertaining to the schedule,
should there be any inquiries from the newspapers.
Public Relations --------------_.-----------Robert Bugdanowitz, Chairman
The work and effectiveness of the Public Relations Committee
of the Denver Bar Association was considerably enhanced during
the past year by the assistance of the Association's paid consultants, Mr. William Kostka and Mr. Claude Ramsey. Their years
of experience and their contacts with local news disseminating
organizations has been invaluable in making many important decisions of paramount interest to the Association.
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The primary objective achieved throughout the term was
reliance upon and use of the Committee and its professional consultants by officers and other committees of the Association. Unfortunate experiences with respect to the Judicial Primary and
with respect to the canon forbidding the taking of newspaper
photographs during a judicial hearing have made the entire membership aware of the need for a firm and constant public relations
program.
The Committee through its Chairman worked closely with the
Association officers and the Bar Primary Committee, particularly
in an effort to undo the unexpected damage caused by the change
in editorial policy of the two Denver newspapers with respect to
the Bar Primary. Whereas complete cooperation and favorable
editorials were the result of the Association's effort to recommend
judicial candidates in 1952, the reverse was true in 1954, and the
Association suffered in the eyes of the public by the stories and
editorials written.
The matter culminated in two separate luncheon meetings with
editors of the two major newspapers in Denver, Public Relations
Committee members, and officers of the Association. The "letting
down of hair", so to speak, which transpired at these luncheon
meetings was invaluable to the Association from the standpoint
of future public relations. The opinions as to prior treatment,
mutual problems, and the profession generally were freely discussed and all concerned felt a great deal had been accomplished
by this meeting. Responsibility was delegated by the newspaper
editors with a firm promise that any complaints as to unjust treatment would be investigated and handled with dispatch. It is
heartily recommended that these meetings be continued on a regular basis, at least annually, and, if possible, with more frequency.
The Committee was consulted with respect to the Colorado
Bar Association Bulletin, which has been handled in an admirable
manner by the Secretary and the professional consultants. It is
felt that the Committee should be of much more assistance in preparation of this bulletin, and that the Secretary, if he desires, be
relieved of that responsibility. It is felt that the dissemination
of news could be facilitated by making the bulletin the responsibility of two or more members of the Committee and the professional consultants. The Bar Association office could still be the
focal point for sending information for the bulletin, and the Secretary, who probably knows more about the Association's activities,
would be consulted with considerable frequency for data to be included. It is felt that the Committee has been successful in making
individual members more public relations conscious. A clearing
house has been set up whereby attorneys who gain newsworthy
personal achievements can advise the Committee, which in turn
has been successful in getting those achievements published,
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whereby they might otherwise have gone unnoticed by the press
and radio. With the great amount of civic and fraternal work
done by members of the profession, it is felt that every opportunity to publicize these facts to the general public should be
utilized.
The Committee has been consulted with respect to social affairs, dissemination of committee reports of interest to the general
public such as the minimum fee schedule, sponsorship by the Association of a recent film from the book by Justice William 0.
Douglas, "Almanac of Liberty", and other matters of a public
relations nature. It is hoped that the opinions of the committee
were well taken, even though many were not subsequently followed
and that the opinions of the committee have been helpful.
The Committee has arranged for Association sponsorship in
charity drives and appropriate publicity has been given to the
Association. It is felt that more use of the Committee and its professional consultants should be made by committee chairmen before
disseminating information about the various committee work to
the press and radio. An off-hand remark or statement made by
some committee chairman without a thorough discussion in advance as to its putilic relations consequences has been detrimental
to the committee in many instances. Legal opinions by some committee chairmen and members, quoted without research or sufficient thought, have on occasion been proven fallacious and have
hurt the entire Association.
Sufficient credit should be given to the State Committee under
the able chairmanship of Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. The Denver
Committee has been of little assistance to him and has tried not to
indulge in duplication of effort. The fine pamphlets available to
the public, the excellent advertisements by banks and trust companies, the superb displays at Association meetings and elsewhere
are entirely the work of the State Committee and no credit is
sought or desired by the local committee.
The Committee continues to be available for participation in
projects of the State Committee, and for consultation by any
of the Association's committees on any subject.
Insufficient meetings were held, looking at the matter in retrospect, but too many matters in which the Committee's suggestions were sought were so called "emergency matters" or matters in
which meetings were scheduled for the same or the next day, with
insufficient time to get the thought of the entire committee. Too
many times a decision or opinion had to be rendered immediately,
without the chance to call a committee meeting. Perhaps the
Chairman took his responsibilities too seriously and could have
made mandatory the holding of a meeting before giving an opinion. Much was lost by not having the benefit of discussion and
thought by the entire committee or a majority thereof. This was
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not the committee members' fault, because each and every member
was extremely cooperative when asked to participate.
It is felt that the Committee should have a secretary of its
own and/or a vice-chairman. Another member of the Committee
should have the benefit of participation in each of the activities the
Committee is called upon to do. This will make for "two heads",
always much better than one, and will help to train another member
in the work of the Committee with a goal to making him chairman
after a year or so of familiarity with the work of the Committee.
I feel the chairmanship should be passed around and not held by
one member more than one or two years. Fresh opinions from
different individuals should be available to the membership, the
officers, and the committees. It is too easy for a chairman, particularly with some training in journalism to become set in his ways
and to lose some perspective in that he is thinking from all angles,
and not too effectively.
The Chairman of this Committee had the pleasant opportunity, thanks to the Association's secretary, of addressing the Junior
Bar Association of Hawaii in Honolulu in April of 1955. It activated an interest in public relations never realized by this group.
and an intense gratitude to the Denver Bar has already been manifested by correspondence from Honolulu.
Particular thanks are due to the President~of the Association,
Louis G. Isaacson, and the Secretary, Mr. Donald S. Molen. who
have been of invaluable assistance. Their confidence in the Committee has been amply demonstrated by the number of times the
Committee has been consulted, and I think the fact that the Committee has been called upon for assistance has given it a much
needed "shot-in-the-arm."
Real Estate ................................. Edwin J. Wittelshofer, Chairman
(No report filed)
Topical Luncheons ................................. Maurice Reuler, Chairman
Our Committee arranged for five luncheons during the past
year. These luncheons covered three different subjects, namely:
"Preparation of Federal Estate and Colorado Gift Tax Returns",
"Method of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Colorado", and "Problems in Financial Organization of Small Corporations".
On the whole these luncheons were well attended and in every
instance we had more than twice as many reservations as we had
places for the group. It is my belief that the Topical Luncheons
form a basis for a splendid workshop among a small group of
lawyers. It offers a chance for attorneys to discuss their problems
in a given field in a most helpful manner. It is my thought that
five or six luncheons a year, however, is sufficient, as that permits
two luncheons on each topic giving a coverage of perhaps 100 per-
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sons to each subject. We did have the problem of attendance as
correlated to reservations, and I think the solution to this matter
lies in the procedure which we adopted during mid-year, namely,
to send a reminder letter to all who make reservations, having the
remainder reach their desk about a day prior to the actual luncheon.
This, of course, necessitates an increased budget for our Committee. However, the money spent by this Committee seems to me to
be as well spent as any money used in our organization.
In conclusion I would like to note the excellent cooperation
given me, not only by my Committee members, but also by the
various speakers at the luncheons. This makes the work of a
Committee chairman not only much easier, but also more gratifying.
Unauthorized Practice(No report filed)
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It might be well to add that the DICTA staff
solicits any article which would be of general interest to Colorado attorneys. If, at times, an article which has been submitted does not appear for
an issue or two, it is because of the limited space
in our publication.
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